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I. INTRODUCTION
The exercise of political power by a state within Indian Country is a
confusing legal problem that has vexed the American legal system from
its inception and remains a fundamental source of ongoing litigation.
The United States Supreme Court first faced the problem in Worcester
v. Georgia' and decided that a state's power over the territory of an
* Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minnesota);
Commissioner, Navajo Tax Commission, Navajo Nation (Arizona, New Mexico, Utah);
Commissioner, Tesuque Tax Commission, Tesuque Pueblo (New Mexico); Associate Justice,
Court of Appeals, Prairie Island Indian Community (Minnesota).
1. See 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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Indian tribe within a state's political boundaries stopped at the
boundary of the tribe.' This conclusion rested on two fundamental
theories. First, Indian tribes had a preexisting political existence that
provided them with rights of self-government and the continued right to
occupy their lands.3 And second, the federal government, not the state
government, possessed the political power to determine ongoing
political relationships through its treaty-making power and the power to
regulate commerce with the Indian tribes as spelled out in the Federal
Constitution.' With the power to determine political relations resting in
the federal government, any federal laws and any ratified treaties
subordinated and nullified any state power over tribes and their
protected territories.5 A fundamental purpose of treaties between the
United States and tribes was to protect the political autonomy of tribes
and their territorial integrity, which was constantly threatened by white
encroachment.6
As we move from 1832 to 2008, we find that states are eager to
exercise their power within Indian Country. One such state power is the
power of taxation. Tribes, their members, and all others within Indian
Country continue to be subject to state attempts to impose their taxes
whenever they can, even though Worcester v. Georgia seems to say that
state power stops at the reservation boundary.7 Federal case law now
2. See id. at 561 ("The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no
force .... ").
3. See id. at 542-43 ("America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited
by a distinct people, divided into separate nations, independent of each other and of the rest
of the world, having institutions of their own, and governing themselves by their own laws.").
4. See id. at 557 ("The treaties and laws of the United States contemplate the Indian
territory as completely separated from that of the states; and provide that all intercourse with
them shall be carried on exclusively by the government of the union.").
5. See id. at 561 ("The act of the state of Georgia, under which the plaintiff in error was
prosecuted, is consequently void, and the judgment a nullity.").
6. See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A
POLITICAL ANOMALY 42, 64, 88 (1994).
7. See generally Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005) (Kansas
attempts to impose motor fuel taxes on gasoline sold at a station owned by the tribe on its
reservation); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995) (Oklahoma
attempts to impose various taxes on the Chickasaw Nation and its members); Bryan v. Itasca
County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (Minnesota county attempts to impose a property tax on the
mobile home of a tribal member living on the Leech Lake Reservation); McClanahan v. Ariz.
State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (Arizona attempts to impose its income tax on a
Navajo woman who lives and works on the Navajo Nation); Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz.
State Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965) (Arizona attempts to impose its sales tax on a
federally licensed Indian trader selling goods and services on the Navajo Nation); Thomas v.
Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898) (Oklahoma Territory attempts to impose a tax on cattle owned by a
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specifically provides that states cannot impose their taxes on tribes or
their members for activities within Indian Country unless Congress
allows such taxation by affirmative federal legislation.8 In the case of
non-Indians, the case law seems to say that states can tax non-Indians
for their activities within Indian Country unless a treaty, federal law, or
federal regulation preempts the state power to tax. 9 The Supreme
Court of the United States has yet to address the question of a state's
power to tax the on-reservation activity of an Indian who is not a
member of the tribe where the activity takes place.1° The most common
situation involves a Native American who lives and works on the
reservation of a tribe and is a member of a different tribe. In such a case
in a state that has an income tax, the state usually takes the position that
its power to tax incomes extends to that particular Native American."
If, however, the Native American were a member of the tribe where she
lives and works, then the case law is clear-the state has no power to
impose its income tax. 2
In this Article, I assert that a state's power to impose its income tax
does not extend to Native Americans who live and work on a
reservation of a tribe of which they are not members. The primary legal
authority for such a conclusion is Worcester v. Georgia3 and the absence
non-Indian when the cattle were on reservation lands under a lease with the tribe); The
Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866) (Kansas county attempts to impose property
taxes on lands owned by Shawnee Indians).
8. See Okla. Tax Comm'n, 515 U.S. at 457-59.
9. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 175 (1989).
10. See Ariz. Dep't of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co., 526 U.S. 32, 34 (1999) (involving
imposition of Arizona's transaction privilege tax on a corporation owned by Native
Americans from Montana where the corporation conceded that it should be treated as a non-
Indian taxpayer; therefore, the issue discussed and analyzed in this Article was not decided).
11. See, e.g., In re Smith, 158 B.R. 818, 818 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1993) (finding that a Navajo
husband of a member of the Hopi Tribe who lived with his wife on her reservation was liable
for the Arizona income tax); LaRock v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 621 N.W.2d 907, 908-09 (Wis.
2001) (finding that a member of the Menominee Tribe who married a member of the Oneida
Tribe, had children who were members of her husband's tribe, and lived and worked on her
husband's reservation was subject to the Wisconsin income tax); N.M. Taxation & Revenue
Dep't v. Greaves, 864 P.2d 324, 325 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that a member of the
Rosebud Sioux Tribe was subject to the New Mexico income tax when he lived on the
Jicarilla Apache Tribe Reservation where he worked as a tribal judge); Luger v. Fong, N.D.
Office of Admin. Hearings File No. 20050257 (Dec. 28, 2006) (on file with author) (finding
that a member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe was subject to the North Dakota income
tax because she lived on the Standing Rock Tribe Reservation where she owned and operated
a convenience store).
12. See McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 165 (prohibiting Arizona from imposing an income tax
on a member of the Navajo Nation when she lived and worked on the reservation).
13. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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of any federal law challenging this conclusion. Nonetheless, some state
appellate courts have concluded that federal law does authorize the
state income taxation of the income of a Native American who lives and
works on a reservation of which she is not a member. 14
Part II of this Article provides an extensive history of the political
status of Indian tribes, starting with the colonial period and ending in
the 1940s. The dominant picture is one of political separation that
necessarily means freedom from British, colonial, state, or federal
taxation. In Part III, this Article considers the leading federal and state
cases that have dealt with the question of state income taxation of non-
member Indians. Part IV summarizes where the history and case law
should take the United States Supreme Court when it ultimately decides
the question. I conclude that the Court should treat all reservation
Indians the same and recognize that they are exempt from state income
tax when they live and work on a reservation.
II. THE ANTECEDENTS
A. The Colonial Period
In matters of taxation, the British colonies of North America did not
impose taxes on those indigenous peoples who remained politically
separate from the colonies. The legal treatment of tribes during the
colonial period was very complex. Colonial officials negotiated a large
number of treaties with tribes, and those treaties took numerous forms.'
Only in Virginia did the practice arise of treating some tribes as
politically subservient. These "tributary" tribes, by the terms in their
treaties with Virginia, were subject to taxation. 6 But this taxation was
symbolic and meant only to demonstrate and establish Virginia's
dominance. 7 The actual taxation involved ritual and annual tribute of
14. See supra note 11.
15. See generally 1-20 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS: TREATIES AND LAWS,
1607-1789 (Alden T. Vaughan ed., 1979-1989) (20 vols.) [hereinafter EAID].
16. See J.H. ELLIOT, EMPIRES OF THE ATLANTIC WORLD: BRITAIN AND SPAIN IN
AMERICA 1492-1830, at 42, 62 (2006) (describing an initial intention to exact substantial
tribute from the indigenous peoples but then switching to ritual tribute, which in the case of
the Powhatans amounted to ten beaver skins a year in a treaty concluded in 1646).
17. See, e.g., Spotswood's Treaty with Saponi, Stukanoe, Occaneechi, and Totero
Indians, art. XI, February 27, 1714, reprinted in 4 EAID, supra note 15, at 220, 223 (requiring
the annual payment of three arrows "as an acknowledgement of their dependance on the
Crown of Great Britain").
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nominal value. 8 By subjecting themselves to this ritual taxation, these
tributary tribes demonstrated that they had become subject to the
legislative authority of Virginia. The Virginia system distinguished
between two types of tribes: tributary and non-tributary. The non-
tributary tribes had no ongoing obligation to pay tribute and
acknowledged no submission to the legislative will of Virginia.19
The rest of the colonies, with the exception of Massachusetts for a
time, made no distinction between tributary and non-tributary tribes."
Instead, treaties tended to involve land cessions and the fixing of
boundaries. In some cases, a tribe might have no territory left, in which
case its political existence ended and its members joined other tribes" or
assimilated into white society.22 A survey of colonial taxes shows that
colonial legislatures never attempted to tax the lands of tribes even
though the lands were theoretically within the political boundary of the
colony.23 To the colonial inhabitants, non-taxation of Native Americans
within their political boundaries made perfect sense because these
Native Americans were not part of the colonial polity. The colonial
boundaries were merely expansive claims based on charters from the
British Crown. In practice, these tentative boundaries merely meant
that the particular colony, to the exclusion of other colonies, had the
right to deal with specific Native American tribes and acquire some or
all of their lands through treaty.24 Pennsylvania is a good example of
this process. The royal charter to William Penn gave him territory
roughly in the area of the current State of Pennsylvania. 2 This charter
enabled him to begin dealing with the Native Americans in the region
18. See id.
19. See, e.g., Implementing the Treaty of 1722 with the Iroquois, Nov. 1, 1722, reprinted
in 4 EAID, supra note 15, at 360 (discussing treaty with Iroquois, establishment of
boundaries, and use of passports to control access between territories).
20. See ALAN TAYLOR, AMERICAN COLONIES 193-94 (2001) (describing the period
from 1634 to 1664 when Puritan colonies extracted wampum payments as tribute from various
tribes).
21. See id. at 202 (describing the departure of the Narragansett from southern New
England to northern New England to join the Abenaki).
22. See id. at 203 (describing assimilation as a process in which the Native Americans
were relegated to the lowest rungs of the social ladder and left to do menial jobs).
23. See id. at 146-48.
24. See generally EAID, supra note 15 (discussing the various colonial treaties
negotiated between 1607 and 1789).
25. Charter for the Province of Pennsylvania, 1681, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/pa0l.htm#bl (grant from Charles II to William
Penn from the Delaware River westward by five degrees of longitude, which at that latitude is
approximately 250 miles).
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and to extinguish their title through treaties.26 If the royal charter the
British Crown had given him included complete ownership of the lands
in a broad political sense, treaties with tribes and payment for their
lands would have been unnecessary.
In the aftermath of a treaty, if a tribe retained territory within a
colony, the tribe remained politically separate and continued to enjoy
rights of self-government. 7 Indeed, the colonial treaties and the federal
treaties that followed after the formation of the United States are ample
proof that political separation was the solid, fundamental, and
foundational legal'paradigm describing the relationship of the colonies
and the tribes. If tribes retained no right of self-government, then
treaties would have been a nonsensical way to arrange political
relationships. Instead, legislation would have been the way for a colony
to assert its political authority over tribes. Colonies passed many laws
involving Native Americans, but a review of these laws shows that they
did not have extra-territorial effect.2 s
In summary, then, we see a clear picture of colonies not taxing
tribes, their members, or activities taking place within Indian Country.
Obviously, colonies viewed these lands and peoples as beyond their
taxing power. The foregoing discussion might suggest that the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were times of relative peace
between white colonists and Native Americans in what is now the
eastern part of the United States. Nothing could be further from the
truth. Violent conflicts between whites and Native Americans occurred
throughout this period. 29 For this reason, tribes were often on the move,
and it was common for members of declining tribes to join stronger
tribes.30 Notably, colonies made no distinction between those Native
Americans who had newly joined a tribe or who were residing with a
26. See TAYLOR, supra note 20, at 269 (describing William Penn's practice of dealing
fairly with the Delaware Indians and paying a fair price for their lands before settlement by
English immigrants).
27. See, e.g., Articles of Agreement Between William Penn and the Susquehannah,
Shawoneh and North Patomack Indians, Apr. 23, 1701, reprinted in 1 EAID, supra note 15, at
101 (leaving the affected tribes with "full and free privileges and Immunities of all the Said
Lands").
28. See generally EAID, supra note 15 (no reference to state taxation of independent
tribes); Library of Virginia, Colonial Tithables, Research Notes No. 17,
http://www.lva.virginia.gov/whatwehave/tax/lrn7_tithables.htm (last visited May 14, 2008)
(explaining the assessment of tithes as a tax on households that included Native American
servants, but not other Native Americans).
29. See JOHN TEBBEL & KEITH JENNISON, THE AMERICAN INDIAN WARS 1-130 (1960)
(describing the various conflicts through the Revolutionary War).
30. See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 20, at 200-03.
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tribe on a temporary basis. All of them were viewed as beyond the
reach of the colonial power to tax.
B. British Taxation
Each British American colony followed its own political structure
based on its own unique history.31 Nonetheless, Britain retained a broad
claim of dominion over these colonies and their territories." A part of
this claimed dominion included the British power to tax activities within
the colonies.3 3 The colonists contested this power and asserted that the
power to tax could come only from the people through their
legislature.' British taxes in the American colonies, according to the
colonists, were illegal because the legislative body enacting the taxes,
the British Parliament, did not include representatives from the
colonies.35 This argument gave rise to the popular slogan: "No taxation
without representation!"
3 6
An interesting aspect of the British taxes was that they did not
extend into Indian Country.37 Although the British Crown claimed
political dominion over the tribes and their territories through the
discovery doctrine, the Crown's practice was to treat colonists as
subjects and Native Americans as allies.3" In modern times, we think of
a subject owing allegiance and an ally owing support. We view an ally's
refusal to make good on obligations under an alliance as bad form,
whereas we think of a subject's active refusal as something close to
treason. In the eighteenth century, then, the British Crown clearly
viewed the colonists as within the scope of Parliament's power to tax.
39
31. See RICHARD MIDDLETON, COLONIAL AMERICA: A HISTORY, 1585-1776, at 49-
242 (2d ed. 1996).
32. See, e.g., id. at 202-07 (describing the end of the proprietary system in the Carolinas).
33. See id. at 448 (describing British taxes imposed in 1733 and 1764 on commodities
sold in the colonies).
34. See id. at 450-51.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 451.
37. See id. (describing the Stamp Act taxes as falling on legal documents, merchants
posting bonds on cargoes, individuals receiving college degrees, farmers recording title to
land, innkeepers seeking licenses, masters taking indentured servants, and printers publishing
newspapers, almanacs, and pamphlets).
38. See FINTAN O'TOOLE, WHITE SAVAGE: WILLIAM JOHNSON AND THE INVENTION
OF AMERICA 10-11 (2005) (describing the Mohawk Nation alliance with Britain against
France in the context of a visit between Mohawk representatives and Queen Anne in
London).
39. See TAYLOR, supra note 20, at 437-42 (describing the British Parliament's colonial
taxes following the French and Indian War in the 1760s and the reaction of the colonists to
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We may view Parliament's failure to tax activity within Indian Country
as strong indirect evidence of political separation.
Further evidence of political separation between Britain and the
tribes is the Royal Proclamation of 1763. 40 In the Proclamation, King
George III declared a political separation between the colonies and
Indian Country. This political boundary also reflected the view that the
tribes, although within the British sphere of influence, remained
independent.4 The Crown's expectation was that the tribes would be
loyal allies of the British. Such a concern was important because many
of the tribes at that time had fought on the side of the French over
British control of North America.42
From an imperial point of view, Britain also wanted to use the tribes
as a force to contain the colonists along the Atlantic seaboard." This
strategy was designed to make sure that the colonists would remain
dependent on British manufactured goods. British laws required that
the goods be delivered in British ships." This strategy also explains why
the Royal Proclamation of 1763 made colonial access to tribal lands
subject to Crown approval. If colonists could not move west, they would
need to stay near the seaboard.
C. Confederation and the Early Federal Period
The preceding discussion of colonial and British treatment of tribes
shows a clear picture of tribes as politically independent and beyond the
taxing power of colonial legislatures or the British Parliament. Under
the Articles of Confederation, responsibility over Indian affairs was
confused. 5 The former colonies, now states, asserted that they acquired
these taxes).
40. See Proclamation of 1763, Oct. 7, 1763, reprinted in 9 ENGLISH HISTORICAL
DOCUMENTS, AMERICAN COLONIAL DOCUMENTS TO 1776, at 639 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1955)
(reserving to the various Indian tribes lands that had not been ceded or purchased by the
British Crown).
41. See id. (ensuring unmolested and undisturbed possession to "the several nations or
tribes of Indians with whom we [the Crown] are connected").
42. See TAYLOR, supra note 20, at 428-37.
43. See MIDDLETON, supra note 31, at 446.
44. See Navigation Act of 1696, § 2 (Apr. 10, 1696), reprinted in ENGLISH HISTORICAL
DOCUMENTS, supra note 40, at 359.
45. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 558-59 (1832) (Justice Marshall
described how the practices of the Continental Congress and the ambiguity in the Articles of
Confederation led to provisions in the United States Constitution that made it clear that
control over Indian affairs was clearly in the hands of the federal government.).
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full sovereignty over tribes within their boundaries. 6 Nonetheless,
federal treaties were negotiated with tribes, and the Continental
Congress regulated Indian affairs.47  Notwithstanding this confusion,
states did not attempt to impose taxes on those tribes having clear
boundaries and continued the colonial and British imperial practice of
not taxing Native Americans living on lands protected by treaty or
occupied without prior dislocation or dispossession. 8 These tribes
remained politically separate under a continuation of the colonial and
British practices.
The question of federal taxation of tribes under the Articles of
Confederation could not and did not arise because the federal
government had no power to tax. Instead, the federal government could
raise revenue only through a requisition system, by which the states
imposed taxes and paid them to the federal government.49 This system
of raising federal revenue proved to be inadequate and was one of the
more important reasons why the Constitutional Convention was
convened in Philadelphia in 1787.50
Under the Articles of Confederation, it was unclear whether the
federal government had power over territory outside the boundary of a
state and within the territorial boundaries fixed by the Treaty of Paris"
at the conclusion of the Revolutionary War." These boundaries
coincide roughly with the current United States boundaries from Maine
to Georgia and west to the Mississippi, excluding Florida and most
southern parts of Alabama and Mississippi. 3 The federal government
could have argued that its claimed dominion over this territory,
occupied primarily by Native Americans, allowed taxation of them. The
federal government never made such a claim.
The absence of a federal effort to tax Native Americans and their
lands at a time when the federal government faced bankruptcy" is very
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See generally EAID, supra note 15 (not noting any such taxes).
49. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VIII.
50. See T. HARRY WILLIAMS ET AL., A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES TO 1876, at
171 (1961) (explaining that one of the tasks of the Constitutional Convention was to provide
the national government with a direct power to tax).
51. See Paris Peace Treaty of 1783, Sept. 3, 1783, art. 2, 8 Stat. 80 (describing the
boundaries of the Unites States).
52. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (resolution of boundary disputes
between and among states); id. art. XI (admission of new states).
53. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 50, at 236.
54. See id. at 169 (explaining that the domestic debt of $34 million went unpaid but that
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telling. Had the members of the Continental Congress believed that
tribes, their members, and their lands were within a federal power to
tax, they surely would have exercised such a power through the
enactment of a taxing statute. Then, as now, the nonpayment of a
lawfully imposed tax allows the taxing authority to seize the taxpayer's
property to satisfy the tax.5 Such a taxation regime would have been a
much cheaper way of acquiring Indian lands than negotiating treaties
and making payments. The members of the Continental Congress,
however, had just fought a war with Britain and asserted that Parliament
could not impose taxes on colonists because colonists had no elected
members in Parliament. Under the new state governments (the former
colonies) state taxation and voting tended to go hand in hand. Owners
of property could vote, and their property was subject to taxation.56
Those individuals who did not own property were viewed as paying little
or no taxes and, therefore, generally could not vote. Taxation and
political participation were strongly linked to each other. 7 To members
of the Continental Congress, it would have been obviously unfair and
illegal to tax Native Americans who maintained political separation
from any states.
Shortly before the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, the
Continental Congress passed the federal legislation creating the
Northwest Territory and a structure and process for the creation of new
states in the area now occupied by Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan,
Wisconsin, and part of Minnesota. 8 The language of this statute, the
Northwest Ordinance, makes reference to Native Americans, their
lands, and their right of continued occupation. 9 The legal requirement
of negotiating land cessions from tribes remained the exclusive way for
gaining a right to possession of Indian lands. The government of the
the interest payments on the foreign debt of $10 million were paid with requisitions from
states and proceeds from land sales).
55. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6331(b) (2006) (giving the Secretary of the Treasury the power to
seize and sell property after the taxpayer has been given notice of the liability and neglected
to pay it).
56. See WILLIAMS ETAL., supra note 50, at 143.
57. See id. (noting that property ownership requirements were higher for those seeking
elected office).
58. See Northwest Ordinance, July 13, 1787, 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 334.
59. See id. at 340-41 ("The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the
Indians, their lands and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in
their property, rights and liberty, they never shall be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and
lawful wars authorised by Congress.... ").
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Northwest Territory had a power to tax.60 Notably, that power was
never exercised over tribes or their lands within the territory. Instead,
land cessions were negotiated through treaties.1
Regarding Indian affairs, the text of the Constitution added no
apparent clarity other than to delete the problematic language in the
Articles of Confederation that had suggested that states retained sole
power to deal with tribes within their boundaries. This deletion was the
basis for the now widely accepted principle that management of Indian
affairs is exclusively a federal concern unless expressly modified by
Congress. 6 In addition, the early and active federal administration of
Indian affairs quickly made it clear that this was a federal concern in
which the state had no formal legal role or power.63 In these early years,
states refrained from attempting to tax tribes, their lands, or people who
were within tribal boundaries.
The status of tribes as politically separate and, therefore, beyond a
state's power to tax is clearly reflected in the language of the
Constitution that apportions representatives in Congress. 6  This
provision determines the number of representatives that each state will
have in the House of Representatives. The language of the clause
embodies part of the Great Compromise between the northern and
southern states over whether slaves were to be counted in determining
proportional representation. 65 This clause also provides that "Indians
not taxed" would not be counted in the census.66 Given the treatment of
tribes as politically separate, this phrase makes perfect sense and would
have been understood quite well by the drafters of the Constitution.
Many of the drafters had been involved in the Revolutionary War where
the power of the British Parliament to impose taxes was disputed
60. See id. at 341.
61. For a treaty negotiated under the Articles of Confederation, see Treaty of Jan. 9,
1789, art. II, 7 Stat. 28-29 (describing boundaries and land cessions; remainder of treaty deals
with trade but does not mention power to tax). For a treaty negotiated under the new
Constitution, see Treaty of Aug. 3, 1795, art. III, 7 Stat. 49, 49-50 (confirming boundaries and
making land cessions; no mention of subjection of tribes to state, territorial, or federal
taxation).
62. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832) (explaining that the
Constitution removed the ambiguity over the federal and state roles over Indian affairs).
63. See, e.g., County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985)
(determining that the Oneida Nation had a valid land claim because New York's purported
purchase of their land in 1795 violated a 1793 federal statute that required federal approval of
all land transfers from Indian tribes).
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
65. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 50, at 176.
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
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because the colonists had no representation in that lawmaking body.
The phrase "Indians not taxed" shows that the states did not view tribes
or the Indian people within tribal boundaries as subject to state taxation.
To the drafters it would have been obviously unfair and illegal to impose
taxation on Indians who were not political members of the state.
Indians who retained their residence with a tribe having political
boundaries, even though such persons would have been physically
present within a state, would not have been residents of it.
A review of early state tax laws shows no attempts to tax tribes.
Many Indians living within Indian Country lived on tribal lands different
from their own tribe.67 States made no effort to single out these Indians
as appropriate objects of state taxation. Instead, the states viewed
Indian Country as a barrier to the exercise of state power. In fact, it was
the acceptance of this view that led Georgia to take extreme measures
and unilaterally try to extinguish the Cherokee Nation.
D. Worcester v. Georgia
The discussion thus far has provided an historical background that
demonstrates why states found themselves within a well accepted legal
paradigm in which tribes enjoyed political separation and, as a result,
were beyond the taxing power of states. The 1832 case of Worcester v.
Georgia is a United States Supreme Court case that accurately reflects,
accepts, and incorporates this well-accepted legal paradigm. 8 Georgia
took the clearly erroneous legal position that its sovereignty extended
over the Cherokee Nation because the Cherokee Nation was located
within the state's boundaries.69  Georgia's position was entirely
67. See MIDDLETON, supra note 31, at 353 (describing the intermixing of the Iroquois
Nations during the late colonial period "so that some of the clans became so mixed as to have
lost much of their racial distinctiveness").
68. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832). Justice John Marshall,
regarding past practices, wrote:
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent
political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the
undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single
exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them
from intercourse with any other European potentate than the first
discoverer of the coast of the particular region claimed: and this was a
restriction which those European potentates imposed on themselves, as
well as on the Indians.
Id.
69. See id. at 557 ("The treaties and laws of the United States contemplate the Indian
territory as completely separated from that of the states .... ").
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inconsistent with the well-accepted paradigm that tribes retained their
sovereignty even though they found themselves within the political
boundaries of British dominions, individual colonies, individual states,
and a federal territory. Georgia's argument, on the surface, seemed
logical. A state's legislative power should extend to all of the territory
within its boundaries.7" But Georgia's position was completely
inconsistent with the long tradition of treaty-making that Georgia, both
as a colony and as a state, had followed.7" Ironically, it was the earlier
treaty-making process that had ensured that the territorial integrity of
Georgia would be respected by receiving land cessions and clear title to
lands.72
In the early 1800s, the federal government of the United States had
committed itself to extinguishing Indian title within Georgia.73 The only
legal method for extinguishing such title was through just war or
through tribal consent expressed in a properly negotiated and legally
ratified treaty.74 Notwithstanding attempts by the federal government to
negotiate a treaty for the removal of the Cherokee Nation to the west,
the Cherokee Nation asserted, properly so, its right to retain its lands
and its right of self-government.75 This right of self-government existed
70. Georgia did not actually represent itself in the Supreme Court proceeding under the
theory that the Court had no jurisdiction over it. I infer from the actions of the Georgia
legislature that it was asserting a territorial sovereignty.
71. Justice Marshall noted that Georgia's historical behavior was consistent with the
paradigm of federal supremacy and political separation. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at
560.
72. See, e.g., Treaty of June 16, 1802, 7 Stat. 68-70 (involving land cessions by the Creeks
that benefited Georgia).
73. See PRUCHA, supra note 6, at 156 (describing an 1802 compact between the United
States and Georgia, in which the federal government agreed to extinguish Indian title within
Georgia in exchange for the state's release of its claims to western lands).
74. President Andrew Jackson contested this legal principle and asserted that the United
States and Georgia had sufficient military strength to force their removal with or without the
consent of the Cherokee, Creeks, Chickasaw, Choctaws, or Seminoles. See WILCOMB E.
WASHBURN, THE INDIAN IN AMERICA 166 (1975).
75. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 556-57 ("From the commencement of our
government, [C]ongress has passed acts ... which treat them as nations, respect their rights,
and manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate. All these acts
... consider the several Indian nations as distinct political communities, having territorial
boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within
those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guarantied by the United States.").
Henry Knox, serving as Secretary of War in George Washington's administration stated the
proposition quite succinctly:
The Indians being the prior occupants, possess the right of the soil. It
cannot be taken from them unless by their free consent, or by the right of
conquest in case of a just war. To dispossess them on any other principle,
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even though the Cherokee Nation found itself within the United States
and within the State of Georgia.76 Georgia, primarily because of the
opportunity for its white citizens to make large profits from Cherokee
lands, decided to reject the predominant legal paradigm and to pass
legislation making the political existence of the Cherokee Nation
impossible. 7 Georgia hoped to drive the Cherokee Nation out of
existence and to drive its people out of the state.78
The Georgia legislation was passed in December 1830.79 It was the
provision in the Georgia statute requiring white persons to apply for and
receive a permit to enter the territory of the Cherokee Nation that
Samuel Worcester violated.8s  Georgia arrested, charged, and
prosecuted Worcester for violating the state statute." A Georgia jury
convicted him, and a Georgia judge sentenced him to four years' hard
labor.' Worcester appealed his conviction to the United States
Supreme Court, and Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, found that
Georgia law stopped at the boundary of the Cherokee Nation. 3 The
holding in Worcester v. Georgia clearly validated the dominant legal
paradigm that tribes were politically separate from states.
The rule of law, however, often does not receive the honor and
obedience that it deserves. Georgia ignored the ruling of the Supreme
Court and did not release Worcester until the Cherokee Nation agreed
to removal. 84  President Andrew Jackson, whose political fortunes
depended on a populist platform that subverted tribal sovereignty,
openly challenged Justice Marshall to enforce his Court's ruling.8
President Jackson ensured his reelection in 1832 by adopting a pro-
would be a gross violation of the fundamental laws of nature, and of that
distributive justice which is the glory of a nation.
REPORT FROM HENRY KNOX RELATIVE TO THE NORTHWESTERN INDIANS, JUNE 15, 1789,
reprinted in 4 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS 12,13 (1832).
76. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 556-57.
77. See ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 104-09
(1970).
78. See id. at 105 ("The Georgia Guard was composed of ruffians, who terrorized the
Cherokees-putting them in chains, tying them to trees and whipping them, throwing them
into filthy jails.").
79. See id. at 104-05.
80. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 539-40.
81. See id. at 540.
82. See id. at 562.
83. See id. at 561.
84. See DEBO, supra note 77, at 105-06.
85. See id.
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Georgia and an anti-Cherokee position. 6 Jackson, a lawyer himself,
understood the legal paradigm and the rule of law and had negotiated
treaties on behalf of the United States while he served in the military.'
Nonetheless, Jackson refused to lift a finger to free Worcester and left
him in prison as a grim reminder to the Cherokee Nation that their legal
rights, enshrined in treaties and given legal supremacy over Georgia
through the U.S. Constitution, were of little value when political leaders
lacked the moral integrity to obey the rule of law and enforce the
mandates of the Constitution." Andrew Jackson knew that Indians
could not vote and, therefore, made the expedient and politically self-
interested decision.
President Jackson's inaction is a national embarrassment. The
decision of Worcester v. Georgia, however, is an opinion of the United
States Supreme Court and is, therefore, an authoritative and legally
binding principle of law. Quite simply, then, Worcester v. Georgia
means that a state's political power stops at the reservation boundary of
a tribe. Accordingly, a corollary of this principle is that a state's power
to tax, as one of its political powers, does not extend across a tribal
boundary. Indeed, Georgia's legislation did not attempt to tax activity
within the Cherokee Nation.
The lawless actions of Georgia and the depredations of its citizens
within the territory of the Cherokee Nation ultimately compelled the
Cherokee to accept the Jackson administration's offer of lands west of
the Mississippi. 89 This was part of Jackson's removal policy designed to
put geographical distance between the whites in Georgia, Alabama,
Florida, and Mississippi, and the Indians that formerly occupied these
lands. Jackson justified this policy as a way of saving Native Americans
in this region from extinction.' Quite ironically, Jackson effectuated his
removal policy through treaties. 9' By modern standards, many of these
treaties are of dubious validity because of fraud and duress.' Some did
86. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 50, at 370 (explaining the support that Jackson
received from the southern states by pursuing his removal policy).
87. See, e.g., Treaty with the Cherokees, Sept. 14, 1816, 7 Stat. 148, 148-49 (Andrew
Jackson was one of the commissioners who signed the treaty.).
88. See DEBO, supra note 77, at 106 (quoting a Cherokee leader predicting Jackson's
treachery and describing Jackson as a "Chicken Snake").
89. See id. at 106-07.
90. See President Andrew Jackson on Indian Removal, Seventh Annual Message, Dec.
7, 1835, reprinted in 4 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1366, 1390-92 (James D.
Richardson ed., 1897).
91. See PRUCHA, supra note 6, at 168-82.
92. See id.
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not even receive Senate ratification, and some were renegotiated
because of questions over validity.93
In any case, Jackson's use of treaties shows that he ultimately
conceded that tribes enjoyed political separation. His proclamation and
his office appeared on treaties that promised to preserve tribal
sovereignty.94 In addition, neither Jackson nor Congress during his two
terms ever attempted to impose any taxes on tribes or their lands.
Ultimately, Jackson, although he scorned the holding in Worcester v.
Georgia, actually followed the legal paradigm and did not repudiate it.
Unfortunately, it was his refusal to enforce the law of the United States
in the first instance that forced the Cherokee Nation and the other
southeastern tribes to accept Jackson's deal and move to the Indian
Territory. And it was the treaty process that made the removal process
"legal" because it was within the accepted legal paradigm.
E. The Confederate Constitution
In 1861, when the Southern States seceded from the Union, they
adopted a constitution. Modeled after the Federal Constitution, the
Confederate Constitution contained a clause determining the number of
representatives from each state to serve in the House of
Representatives. The Confederate Constitution included a provision
that apportioned these representatives among the states based on
population. In counting the population of a state, "Indians not taxed"
were to be excluded.95 This provision shows that the dominant legal
paradigm of political separation for tribes continued in the Confederacy.
Very little Indian Country remained in the Southern States because the
Jacksonian removal doctrine had been vigorously pursued.9 6 However,
a few areas of Indian Country did remain in Alabama, Mississippi,
Arkansas, and Texas. 97 Even for these small remnants, political
separation remained the norm-a norm so strong that the text in the
93. See id.
94. See, e.g., Treaty of Oct. 20, 1832, 7 Stat. 381 (signed by General John Coffee, who
was authorized by the President and proclaimed by the President on March 1, 1833). In
particular, see article IV of the treaty, which states that "the United States will guaranty to
the Chickasaw nation, the quiet possession and uninterrupted use of the said reserved tracts
of land, so long as they may live on and occupy the same." Id. at 383.
95. See CONST. OF CONFEDERATE STATES art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (Feb. 28, 1861), reprinted in 1
JOURNAL OF THE CONGRESS OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA 851 (1904).
96. See DEBO, supra note 77, at 104-09.
97. See, e.g., Clara Sue Kidwell, The Choctaw Struggle for Land and Identity in
Mississippi, 1830-1918, in AFTER REMOVAL: THE CHOCTAW IN MISSISSIPPI 64 (Samuel J.
Wells & Roseanna Tubby eds., 1986).
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Confederate Constitution repeated it. No Confederate states attempted
to tax tribes or activities within tribal boundaries. The absence of
taxation in Indian Country is telling. The Civil War created a dire need
for government revenue, yet the Confederate States did not look to
tribes for revenue. This shows the strength of the dominant legal
paradigm of political separation and immunity from state taxation.
F. Early State Attempts to Tax Tribes
Right after the Civil War, two cases reached the United States
Supreme Court and involved state attempts to impose property taxes on
Indians' lands. The first case, The Kansas Indians," involved the
attempt of Johnson County, Kansas, to impose property taxes on the
lands belonging to a member of the Shawnee Tribe. This member,
named Blue Jacket, held the property under an allotment that was
provided in an 1854 treaty99 negotiated between the Shawnee Tribe and
the United States.'0° Under the treaty, the tribal lands were divided into
allotted lands and surplus lands."0 ' The allotted lands were to be owned
by individual members of the tribe subject to protective restrictions."
The restrictions were designed to protect the tribal member from the
fraudulent practices of whites who often preyed on Native Americans to
acquire title to their lands. 3 The surplus lands were to be held for five
years to allow tribal members who had been separated from the tribe to
select lands under the allotment provisions."°  Any unclaimed lands
were then to be sold and the proceeds held for the benefit of the tribe. 5
Johnson County conceded that it could not tax any lands held in
common, but it claimed that it could tax those lands owned by individual
members, like Blue Jacket.0 6 Essentially, the County was arguing that
these lands owned by individual members ceased to be tribal lands and
should be treated like any other lands owned by residents within
Johnson County. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed, and
concluded that the allotment process undertaken pursuant to the 1854
treaty did not disestablish the tribe or its relationship with the federal
98. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866).
99. See Treaty with the Shawnees, May 10, 1854, 10 Stat. 1053.
100. See The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 753.
101. See Treaty with the Shawnees, supra note 99, art. 2, at 1054-55.
102. See The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 753.
103. For an example of such practices in Oklahoma, see DEBO, supra note 77, at 268-83.
104. See Treaty with the Shawnees, supra note 99, art. 2, at 1054-55.
105. See id.
106. The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 755.
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government. 7 In language evoking the holding in Worcester v. Georgia,
the Court stated that "[a]s long as the United States recognizes [the
Shawnee Tribe's] national character they are under the protection of
treaties and the laws of Congress, and their property is withdrawn from
the operation of State laws."'" Accordingly, The Kansas Indians case
validates the political separation paradigm and affirms that this
separation preempts the state power to tax lands even when held
individually (not in common) in the form of allotments.
The second case, The New York Indians, was issued ten days after
The Kansas Indians case and involved the question of the state power to
tax Indian lands. 1°9 In the New York case, the New York legislature
directly imposed a highway tax on the reservation lands on the
assumption that a treaty and deed had extinguished Indian title and
converted the lands into non-Indian lands.110 The confusion arose
because an 1838 treaty permitted the transfer of fee title immediately
but permitted the members of the Seneca Nation to occupy the
reservation lands for an additional five years. Difficulties arose between
the tribe and the purchasers. A new treaty was entered into in 1842,
before the expiration of the five-year term in the 1838 treaty."' The
new treaty reinstated the tribe's right to possession of the two
reservations."1 The treaty also provided for the sale of the lands of two
other reservations of the tribe. '13 New York assessed taxes, declared
them unpaid and delinquent, then sold most of the lands of three of the
reservations in 1859.114 The Court reduced these transactional
complexities into a simple rule: "Until the Indians have sold their lands,
and removed from them in pursuance of the treaty stipulations, they are
to be regarded as still in their ancient possessions, and are in under their
original rights, and entitled to the undisturbed enjoyment of them."
11 5
This meant that the mere transfer of legal title, without extinguishing
the rights of possession, left the Seneca Nation politically separate and
107. See id. at 755-56.
108. Id. at 757.
109. See The New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1866).
110. See id. at 767 ("[I]t was doubtless assumed [by New York] ... that the whole title
being in the grantees, the State, notwithstanding the possession of the Indians, might enter
upon the reservations in the exercise of its internal police powers, and deal with them as with




114. See id. at 764.
115. See id.
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immune from state taxation.
Two important points come from these cases. First, the attempts at
taxation by Kansas and New York occurred only because each state
believed that the tribes involved no longer existed as separate political
entities. Both states argued this point and lost on the factual question of
whether the tribes continued to have a political existence. Because the
tribes still existed, the state could not tax their lands. Put another way,
the state power to tax stopped at the political boundary of the tribe. In
essence, both Kansas and New York were conceding that their powers
did not extend across tribal boundaries. In their particular cases,
however, the states were asserting that the boundaries had been
extinguished by treaties.
The other important point of these two tax cases is that the United
States Supreme Court continued to apply Worcester v. Georgia and did
so in the context of taxation. These two tax cases, then, ffirmed the
rule of federal law that states could not impose their taxes within Indian
Country until treaties removed the barrier. A few years later, Congress
ended treaty-making with tribes, 6 but the executive branch of the
government continued to execute agreements with tribes."7 Congress
ratified these agreements through subsequent legislation and
appropriations.1 8 The statute that eliminated treaty-making validated
the legal obligations of all the previously ratified treaties with Indian
tribes."9 Obviously, the politically separate character of tribes remained
even after Congress removed the President's power to negotiate treaties
with tribes.'2 °
116. See Act of March 3, 1871, ch. CXX, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71
(2006)).
117. See PRUCHA, supra note 6, at 313-26 (describing the use of agreements as treaty
substitutes from 1872 until 1911).
118. See, e.g., Act of April 21, 1904, ch. 1402, 33 Stat. 189, 194-96 (adopting an
agreement between the United States and the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians).
119. See 25 U.S.C. § 71 (providing that "no obligation of any treaty lawfully made and
ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe prior to March 3, 1871, shall be hereby
invalidated or impaired").
120. My own view is that Congress did not have the power to eliminate the President's
power to negotiate treaties with tribes. The treaty power expressed in Article II of the
United States Constitution is general and does not specifically refer to agreement with Indian
tribes. Nonetheless, the United States negotiated treaties with tribes under the Articles of
Confederation, and George Washington negotiated treaties with Indian tribes shortly after
taking office. The treaties and their ratification by the Senate attracted no known negative
comment from the drafters of the Constitution. Moreover, George Washington was the
presiding official at the Constitutional Convention and, therefore, was well-positioned to
understand that the general treaty power granted to the executive included the power to
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G. The Fourteenth Amendment
With the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, slavery was eliminated. The Fourteenth
Amendment was part of the constitutional restructuring of the United
States that became necessary with the elimination of slavery. A key
change was the method for apportioning each state's share of elected
members to the House of Representatives. As originally adopted, the
Constitution granted each state a number of representatives based on its
size according to population. 121  The impasse at the Constitutional
Convention was over whether to count slaves, which led to a
compromise in which slaves were counted as three-fifths of a person.
The Northern States had proposed that slaves not be counted at all. The
Southern States proposed that slaves be counted the same as all other
persons. The three-fifths rule, which was coupled with a rule on the
apportionment of direct taxes imposed by the federal government,
became known as the "Great Compromise."
12
With the abolition of slavery and the intended treatment of former
slaves as regular citizens, the three-fifths rule no longer made any sense.
Accordingly, the Fourteenth Amendment changed this so that all
individuals would be counted in the census that determined each state's
share of members in the House of Representatives. 123 For our purposes,
there is a big exception. The Fourteenth Amendment reiterated the
rule that "Indians not taxed" would not be counted in the census for this
negotiate treaties with the Indian tribes. Under my view, the President is still free to
negotiate treaties with Indian tribes. To be valid such treaties would require Senate
ratification. If a particular treaty required an appropriation, then the House of
Representatives could block its implementation by withholding funding. As things now
stand, all three branches of government have lived without treaties since 1871, and it is
unlikely that any President would attempt to revive a power that was taken away
unconstitutionally by Congress.
121. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, which provided that
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included within this Union, according to their
respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole
Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of
Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.
122. See SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON ET AL., A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 115-16 (1977).
123. See Scott A. Taylor, State Property Taxation of Tribal Fee Lands Located Within
Reservation Boundaries: Reconsidering County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of
the Yakima Indian Nation and Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Cass County, 23
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 55, 61-62 (1998).
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purpose. 2 ' Therefore, a state such as Kansas, which might have 10,000
Native Americans living on reservation lands and treated as beyond the
power of state taxation, would not have these 10,000 individuals counted
in the federal census. The federal census takers during the nineteenth
century carefully followed this rule and excluded Native Americans
living within reservations or federally recognized Indian communities
when taking each census.'25
The continuation of the "Indians not taxed" rule in the Fourteenth
Amendment makes perfect historical sense. Congress took up and
debated the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866, just one year before the
Supreme Court decided The Kansas Indians and The New York Indians
cases discussed above.'26 Enough state legislatures had ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment when South Carolina approved it on July 9,
1868, and it was certified as adopted by the Secretary of State on July 28,
1868.17 Those two cases reconfirmed the well-established rule that
Native Americans who retained their political identity within a state are
beyond the state's power to tax. The time frame during which the state
considered the Fourteenth Amendment bracketed the dates of decision
in the Kansas and New York cases.
This legal principle was obvious to the members of Congress who
voted for the Fourteenth Amendment and explains the clause's
inclusion. We may assume that the phrase "Indians not taxed" retained
its well-understood meaning: tribes retaining a political existence were
beyond the reach of federal and state taxation. Before proposing the
Fourteenth Amendment to the states, Congress passed the Civil Rights
Bill of 1866.128 The bill as reported from the Judiciary Committee did
not include the phrase "Indians not taxed." Proponents of the measure
indicated that they did not intend to make Native Americans citizens if
they retained tribal relations. 2 9
It was common knowledge, at least to those federal officials
124. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
125. See generally CENSUS OFFICE, DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT ON INDIANS
TAXED AND INDIANS NOT TAXED IN THE UNITED STATES (EXCEPT ALASKA) AT THE
ELEVENTH CENSUS: 1890 (1894).
126. See CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS AMENDED, H.R.
Doc. No. 108-95, at 17 (2003) (notes on proposal and ratification).
127. See id.
128. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
129. See Method of Determining "Indians Not Taxed," Op. Dep't of Interior M-31039
(1940), reprinted in 1 OPINIONS OF THE SOLICITOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
RELATING TO INDIAN AFFAIRS 1917-1974, at 990-91 (1940).
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administering federal Indian policy and to others in proximity to Indian
Country, that many reservations contained Native Americans from
other tribes.3 ° In addition, federal Indian policy often forced different
tribes to consolidate on a single reservation."' Given this known and
substantial intermixing, we find no efforts on the part of states to impose
their taxes on Indians of one tribe living on the reservation of another
tribe. Those efforts would not come until a hundred years later when
the passage of time caused judges to forget that the phrase "Indians not
taxed" had any continuing legal significance.
H. New States and Enabling Legislation
Not long after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress
began the practice of ensuring that states would not attempt to assert
broad taxing powers over Indian Country. We must remember that the
principal source of tax revenues for states during the nineteenth century
was the property tax. 32 If large Indian reservations were within a state,
then that state would naturally want to tax Indian lands to augment its
tax base. In addition, taxation could be used as a tool of dispossession.
Delinquent taxes could be used to justify tax sales and to extinguish the
title of the owner.'33 The historical case is clear. If and when states tax
Indian lands, then Indian title for Indian lands often ends up being
extinguished through tax sales.'3"4 More often than not, Indian lands
were purchased at tax sales for pennies on the dollar. 3 ' Given this
130. See, e.g., Treaty of May 7, 1868, art. II, 15 Stat. 649, 650 (setting the boundaries of
the reservation of the Crow Tribe for the exclusive use of the tribe plus "such other friendly
tribes or individual Indians as from time to time they may be willing ... to admit amongst
them").
131. See, e.g., Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde, Ntsayka Ikanum: Our Story,
http://www.grandronde.org/culture/# (last visited May 14, 2008) (telling the story of the
consolidation of many tribes into the Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde).
132. See Randall J. Gingiss, Forcing Fairness in State Taxation, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 41,
44 (2007) (noting that as late as 1890, the property tax provided seventy-two percent of all
state tax revenue and ninety-two percent of all local tax revenues).
133. See, e.g., The New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1866) (Non-payment of
property taxes led to a tax sale to recover the unpaid taxes on lands where the right to
possession belonged to the Oneida Tribe.); Pennock v. Comm'rs, 103 U.S. 44, 44 (1880)
(Tribal lands granted to Native American without restrictions were lost in a tax sale.).
134. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 543-44 (1980) (discussing amendments
to the General Allotment Act and the intent of Congress to protect allotted Indian lands
from state property taxation so that the land would not be lost through tax sales).
135. Tax sales can provide a windfall for the purchaser because a state taxing authority
will accept the amount of unpaid taxes, which is almost always just a fraction of the fair
market value of the property. In general, property taxes are imposed at about one to two
percent of the fair market value of the land. For property tax purposes, the fair market value
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pernicious practice of state taxing authorities, federal protection was
more than justified."'
The protection came in the form of federal legislation that
prohibited state taxation and that also required states to adopt measures
in their constitutions that would prohibit state taxation of Indian
lands. 137 Protective federal legislation is contained in the statutes that
enabled the formation of many of the western states, including Arizona,
Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South
Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. 38 It is appropriate to ask
why Congress would pass a federal statute prohibiting state taxation and
also require the same prohibition in the new state's constitution.
Obviously, the federal law, because of the Supremacy Clause, would
have been a sufficient legal bar. It is safe for us to surmise that the
threat of state taxation was so likely and substantial that Congress
decided that a double barrel approach was necessary. Perhaps the
thinking was that an explicit rule in a state constitution would operate as
a blinking neon light: "Don't tax Indian lands! Don't tax Indian lands!"
These provisions remain in the constitutions of these states, yet few
legislators in those states are aware of them and very few understand
that the admission of their state to the Union was conditioned on the
promise that their state would not tax Indian lands.
State taxing authorities, however, read these provisions very
narrowly. 139 The prohibition does not mention such taxes as income
of the land is often underestimated. So even if a purchaser in a tax sale has to pay ten years
worth of accumulated taxes, the amount seldom will be over twenty percent of the property's
fair market value.
136. The reader should know that during this same period, federal officials were doing
an abysmal job in protecting Native Americans receiving allotted lands. See DEBO, supra
note 77, at 251-67 (describing the many methods used to defraud Native Americans of
ownership of former tribal lands transferred to them under the federal allotment system).
137. See, e.g., Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, § 2, 36 Stat. 557, 558-59 (enabling statute for
New Mexico that prohibited state taxation of Indian lands until Congress allowed such
taxation); N.M. CONST. art. 21, § 2 (prohibiting New Mexico from taxing Indian lands until
allowed to do so by an act of Congress).
138. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 255-56 nn.17, 19
(1942).
139. See, e.g., McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 484 P.2d 221, 224 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971)
(stating that "[blecause of the nature of a net income tax we are not persuaded by the
reasoning of those cases dealing with the attempt by the state to control or affect Indian real
property"). Not surprisingly, the Arizona Court of Appeals did not cite to Arizona's
constitution or the federal enabling legislation. The court also failed to explain that states did
not then use income taxes and that it would have required uncharacteristic foresight for
Congress to have provided an explicit exemption for Arizona's not yet enacted income tax in
the Arizona enabling legislation that Congress passed in 1910. See Act of June 20, 1910, § 20,
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taxes, payroll taxes, severance taxes, telecommunications taxes, sales
taxes, or a multitude of other taxes. Of course, most of these taxes did
not exist at the time. 4' To be fair, Congress did not and could not
anticipate that these new taxes might be used as a way to get around the
prohibition. In addition, Congress did not think that Indian tribes, as
separate political entities, would be in existence very much longer. In
fact, the text of these restrictions anticipated that such prohibitions
might be lifted in the future by federal legislation. That was the plan at
the time. Congress had begun what we call the allotment process-the
"final solution" to the "Indian question."
I. Allotment
In the preceding sentence I use the words "final solution" '41 and
"Indian question"' 142 to express my own sense of moral outrage over this
36 Stat. at 569-70 (prohibiting Arizona from taxing Indian lands).
140. See generally ALZADA COMSTOCK, STATE TAXATION OF PERSONAL INCOMES
(1921) (showing that states relied primarily on various forms of property taxation for the bulk
of their revenues during the nineteenth century).
141. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN
AFFAIRS 5 (1905) [hereinafter COMMISSIONER'S REPORT OF 1905]. Commissioner Francis E.
Leupp stated:
Some one has styled this a policy of shrinkage, because every Indian
whose name is stricken from a tribal roll by virtue of his emancipation
reduces the dimensions of our red-race problem by a fraction-very small,
it may be, but not negligible. If we can thus gradually watch our body of
dependent Indians shrink, even by one member at a time, we may
congratulate ourselves that the final solution is indeed only a question of a
few years.
Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
142. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN
AFFAIRS 30 (1906) [hereinafter COMMISSIONER'S REPORT OF 1906]. Commissioner Francis
E. Leupp stated:
The legislation of recent years shows conclusively that the country is
demanding an end of the Indian question, and it is right. The Burke law,
wisely administered, will accomplish more in this direction than any other
single factor developed in a generation of progress. When it is
supplemented by other legislation which will enable their pro rata shares
of the tribal moneys to be paid, principal and interest, to competent
Indians, the beginning of the end will be at hand. Such Indians, owning
their land in fee, and receiving their portions of the tribal property
without restriction, can not by any course of action maintain a claim for
further consideration. Thru such measures the grand total of the nation's
wards will be diminished daily and at a growing ratio.
Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
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very dark period in the history of federal Indian policy. It is appropriate
for me to use these shocking words because they are the words used by
Francis E. Leupp, then Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to describe
what he viewed as the beneficial consequences of the allotment
process.143 For many of us who write about Indian law, the allotment
period was an unqualified failure in federal Indian policy.'" No mass
exterminations of people occurred, but tens of thousands of Native
Americans found themselves effectively robbed of their lands by a legal
model allegedly designed to help them.
For those unfamiliar with allotment and the underlying legislation,
let me provide a brief overview. It was the widely held, but erroneous,
view of federal officials during the entire nineteenth century that the
poverty of Indians resulted from their inability to appreciate and
embrace the benefits of private property and understand how
agriculture, through hard work, could enrich a person and that person's
family.' 5 These officials viewed Native Americans as primitive hunter-
gatherers devoid of Christianity and civilization.'4  These officials
believed that the cornerstone of civilization was private property. 
147
They also believed that Native Americans had no conception of private
property.'48 Federal policy documents clearly and painfully reflect these
143. For a full description of his views on the "Indian problem," see generally FRANCIS
E. LEUPP, THE INDIAN AND His PROBLEM (photo. reprint 1971) (1910) (alternating doses of
derisive racism and descriptions of the American Indian as a heroic figure).
144. See DEBO, supra note 77, at 251-67 (describing the fraud, lies, deceit, and massive
dispossession that occurred through the allotment process).
145. See COMMISSIONER'S REPORT OF 1906, supra note 142, at 30.
146. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
INDIAN AFFAIRS 4 (1902). Commissioner William A. Jones stated:
Born a savage and raised in an atmosphere of superstition and ignorance,
[the American Indian] lacks at the outset those advantages which are
inherited by his white brother and enjoyed from the cradle. His moral
character has yet to be formed. If he is to rise from his low estate the
germs of a nobler existence must be implanted in him and cultivated. He
must be taught to lay aside his savage customs like a garment and take
upon himself the habits of civilized life.
In a word, the primary object of a white school is to educate the mind;
the primary essential of Indian education is to enlighten the soul.
Id.
147. See LEUPP, supra note 143, at 27 (indicating that communal ownership of land was
"fatal to all legitimate enterprise").
148. See, e.g., Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian Property Rights and the
Myth of Common Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1559, 1571-94 (2001) (explaining some of
the many property systems that different groups of Native Americans used).
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blatantly racist points of view.'49
The historical record is another matter. It is accurate to say that
before Europeans arrived intensive agriculture was common among
Native Americans in most regions in North America where soil and
climate supported it.5° The ever-expanding archeological record shows
widespread and intensive use of sophisticated agriculture.' In addition,
virtually all narratives of early contact make this conclusion clear. In
regions where agriculture was not a prudent way to make a living,
Native Americans relied heavily on fishing, hunting, gathering, and
forms of horticulture.'52  This was true in Europe as well. So, for
example, fishing was a common subsistence and commercial activity in
Europe.153
Where we have firsthand European accounts, we discover that
Native Americans employed property systems that delineated and
determined individual rights and access to resources. '- It is entirely
accurate to say that Native American property systems were vastly
different from British notions of property. Nonetheless, one can see
similarities and differences that are explained by history, circumstance,
and environment. As time passed, agriculture for Native Americans
changed substantially as European-induced dislocations made
149. See, e.g., COMMISSIONER'S REPORT OF 1905, supra note 141, at 1.
The commonest mistake made by his white wellwishers in dealing
with the Indian is the assumption that he is simply a white man with a red
skin. The next commonest is the assumption that because he is a non-
Caucasian he is to be classed indiscriminately with other non-Caucasians,
like the negro, for instance. The truth is that the Indian has as distinct an
individuality as any type of man who ever lived, and he will never be
judged aright till we learn to measure him by his own standards, as we
whites would wish to be measured if some more powerful race were to
usurp dominion over us.
Id.
150. See CHARLES C. MANN, 1491: NEW REVELATIONS OF THE AMERICAS BEFORE
COLUMBUS chs. 1, 6, 10 (2005).
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See MARK KURLANSKY, COD: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FISH THAT CHANGED THE
WORLD 1-14 (1997).
154. See, e.g., 1 TRAVELS AND WORKS OF CAPTAIN JOHN SMITH: PRESIDENT OF
VIRGINIA, AND ADMIRAL OF NEW ENGLAND 1580-1631, at 79-81 (Edward Arber ed., 1910)
(including a brief description of the property system of the Powhatan Confederacy stating
that tribal members "knowe their severall landes, and habitations, and limits to fish, fowle, or
hunt in [sic]").
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indigenous forms of agriculture more difficult. 55 Native Americans
continued to grow crops where and when they could. In addition,
Native Americans adopted some European agricultural and
horticultural practices, just as Europeans adopted Native American
domesticated plants. In fact, some have estimated that sixty percent of
the domesticated plant species in cultivation around the world come
from the Americas.1 16  The single largest world crop by tonnage is
maize.'57 The story that the indigenous peoples of North America were
not agriculturalists "8 is just flatly untrue.5 9
On the European to Native North American transmission side, the
breeding and trading of horses became very successful activities for
some tribes. Cash crops, such as cotton and tobacco, were raised by
some Native Americans. 'W Many European farm animals became part
of the horticultural pattern for numerous tribes.
6
'
The nineteenth century myth that Native Americans were roaming
forest-dwellers who lived by hunting the animals they found there comes
from the importance of the fur trade to Europeans. Beginning in the
sixteenth century, European fishermen began trading goods for furs and
pelts with Native Americans in the area of Newfoundland.' 62  This
quickly became a very lucrative trade that induced many Native
155. Compare THOMAS JEFFERSON WERTENBAKER, THE FIRST AMERICANS 1607-
1690, at 307-11 (1929) (describing Native Americans as savages knowing little or nothing
about agriculture), with DEBO, supra note 77, at 112 (describing many of the Native
Americans living in the Indian Territory (later Oklahoma) as farming and living "in the same
manner as the frontier white people of their day").
156. See MANN, supra note 150, at 177 ("One writer has estimated that Indians
developed three-fifths of the crops now in cultivation, most of them in Mesoamerica.").




world production of corn by metric ton exceeds that of wheat and rice).
158. See, e.g., Bruce D. Smith, Eastern North America as an Independent Center of Plant
Domestication, 103 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 12,223 (2006)
(presenting evidence about the indigenous domestication of plants in eastern North America,
including squash and sunflowers).
159. See TAYLOR, supra note 20, at 45-46 (concluding that the great European
expansion and increase in population started after 1492 because of increased food production
achieved by European adoption of new world crops).
160. See, e.g., The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 617 (1870) (The
background facts involved the growing, manufacturing, and sale of substantial amounts of
tobacco in the Cherokee Nation by members of the tribe.).
161. See, e.g., CLYDE KLUCKHOHN & DOROTHEA LEIGHTON, THE NAVAHO 35 (rev.
ed. 1974) (noting Spanish reports indicating agriculture and the commercial exploitation of
sheep, goats, horses, and cattle, all of which were of European origin brought by the Spanish).
162. See TAYLOR, supra note 20, at 92.
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Americans to spend substantial amounts of time trapping fur-bearing
animals to trade for European goods. 63 This trade, which was of
substantial importance to the British, Dutch, French, and Spanish,
spread throughout vast reaches of North America, lasted for three
centuries, and remained commercially important through the middle of
the nineteenth century.' 6  For those tribes engaged in the fur trade,
agriculture remained important when climate, soil, and circumstances
permitted. 165
Many European and American narratives dealing with conflicts
between whites and Native Americans repeatedly tell how Indian crops
were destroyed as a routine part of warfare.166 These narratives refute
the myth that Native Americans had no agriculture. Disputes between
Native Americans and colonists in Virginia and Massachusetts
frequently arose because the colonists' pigs and cattle were not fenced
in and would eat the crops planted by Native Americans. 167 Nineteenth-
century federal officials were blind to this obvious history and to the
163. See 1 PAUL CHRISLER PHILLIPS, THE FUR TRADE 15-22 (1961) (providing a
sketch of the rise of the fur and pelt trade in North America).
164. See WILLIAM E. FOLEY & C. DAVID RICE, THE FIRST CHOUTEAUS: RIVER
BARONS OF EARLY ST. LOUIS 72-84 (1983) (describing the 1790s fur trade of the Chouteau
family along the Missouri River); PETER C. NEWMAN, 1 COMPANY OF ADVENTURERS 41-59
(1985) (explaining the economic value of the fur and pelt trade in far northern North
America); DAVID SINCLAIR, DYNASTY: THE ASTORS AND THEIR TIMES 102-12 (1983)
(describing the founding and success of the American Fur Company during the early 1800s).
See generally PHILLIPS, supra note 163.
165. See TAYLOR, supra note 20, at 400 (explaining the use of agriculture by the plains
tribes after 1750).
166. See id. at 132.
"[Tihe English [colonists in Virginia] made violent and terrifying
examples of resisting Indians. In August 1610, Captain George Percy
surprised and attacked a Paspahegh village, killing at least sixty-five
inhabitants and destroying with fire their homes and fields of growing
corn. Taking prisoner the wife and children of the local chieftain, the
colonists headed back to Jamestown by boat. En route, as a sport, they
threw the children overboard and shot them in the water as they tried to
swim for shore.
167. See id. at 47 for an explanation of how the colonists'
pigs and cattle . . . invaded native crop fields to consume precious maize,
beans, and squash. When Indians killed and ate trespassing livestock, the
colonists howled in protest and demanded compensation for their lost
property. When denied, angry colonists sought a disproportionate
revenge by raiding and burning Indian villages.
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crops that were actually growing in Indian Country.'68
The purpose of this slight digression into Native American
agriculture is to show that the factual and historical premises underlying
the theoretical justification for allotment were incorrect. Because these
assumptions were incorrect and because allotment was a flawed and
failed policy, the current United States should give little or no deference
to allotment-era statutes, policies, and assumptions. In the twenty-first
century, virtually no one asserts that inhabitants of land who have rights
of prior possession can be dispossessed of their land because another
group has a system or technology for exploiting the land that would
support a larger population.
It is important to place this shift into historical perspective. Through
the colonial, early federal, and nineteenth century periods, no individual
Indian who might have property rights under the law of the Native
American government could transfer those rights to an individual
Englishman or American.1 69 Title could flow only from a tribe to the
United States, and then to an individual. This is reflected in the case of
Johnson v. M'Intosh."7 ' If tribes, or individuals within tribes, could
transfer their interests only to the United States, then the value of their
lands was impaired. In other words, if the United States was the only
permissible buyer of Indian property in the United States, values would
decline for lack of a market, thus ensuring a low price. Usually, the
price was one or two cents an acre.17' The United States frequently sold
these lands for one dollar per acre or more to land developers and land
168. See, e.g., ELBERT HERRING, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN
AFFAIRS (1832), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 62, 63
(Francis Paul Prucha ed., 3d ed. 2000).
On the whole, it may be matter of serious doubt whether, even with the
fostering care and assured protection of the United States, the
preservation and perpetuity of the Indian race are at all attainable, under
the form of government and rude civil regulations subsisting among them.
These were perhaps well enough suited to their condition, when hunting
was their only employment, and war gave birth to their strongest
excitements.
Id.
169. See, e.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (holding that a transfer
from a tribe to private individuals was ineffective and that a subsequent transfer to the United
States was the only effective way to extinguish Indian title); Proclamation of 1763, reprinted in
9 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 40, at 642.
170. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543.
171. See, e.g., Robert M. Owens, Jeffersonian Benevolence on the Ground: The Indian
Land Cession Treaties of William Henry Harrison, 22 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 405 passim (2002).
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companies. They, in turn, sold these lands for $10 to $50 an acre. 72 The
profits available to the United States were substantial.' And the profits
for land developers were also large.74
By the 1880s, virtually all Native Americans were confined to
reservations.17 1 In 1887, the year that Congress adopted the General
Allotment Act, there were about 138 million acres held by tribes as
reservation lands. 76 Most of the prime agricultural lands were long since
lost through treaty cessions by tribes. Nonetheless, the 138 million
remaining acres had substantial value and were a significant force
behind the passage of the 1887 legislation.177
Under the General Allotment Act, each head of an Indian family on
a reservation subject to allotment was given a fixed amount of land,
usually 80 to 120 acres. 78 Lands not allotted to individual heads of
families were declared surplus lands and were sold to the public. 179 The
proceeds from these sales were placed in trust for the benefit of the tribe
and its members.'80 Not surprisingly, the prices paid for these surplus
lands were usually well below market prices.18" ' As a result, tribes and
their members lost the right to use these lands and did not receive a fair
value for them.
The stated purpose of allotment was to bring private property to
Native Americans so that they could enjoy the fruits of civilization.8 2
172. See id.
173. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 50, at 385-86 (describing $24 million in proceeds
from sales of federal lands as the single largest source of federal revenue in 1836).
174. See id. at 385 (explaining that land speculators purchased seventy-five percent of
public lands sold between 1835 and 1837).
175. DEBO, supra note 77, at 236-50.
176. See id. at 283.
177. See id. at 268-83.
178. See General Allotment Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat. 388, 388.
179. See id. § 5, 24 Stat. at 389.
180. See id. § 5, 24 Stat. at 390.
181. See DEBO, supra note 77, at 269 (describing sale of "surplus" Kickapoo lands at
thirty cents an acre under fraudulent circumstances).
182. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN
AFFAIRS 3 (1889) [hereinafter COMMISSIONER'S REPORT OF 1889].
The Indians must conform to "the white man's ways," peaceably if they
will, forcibly if they must. They must adjust themselves to their
environment, and conform their mode of living substantially to our
civilization. This civilization may not be the best possible, but it is the best
the Indians can get.
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The perceived evil was tribal ownership of lands. Tribal ownership of
lands was viewed as a distinct evil-the primary force causing poverty
and deprivation among Native Americans. Federal officials were not
eager to admit the truth: poverty and deprivation will be the plight of
almost any group of people dispossessed of their lands and isolated on
small parcels of marginal lands.'8 Such was the case for most Native
Americans. It is fair to say that most European settlers would not have
fared very well under similar circumstances. In fact, the historical
record establishes that white homesteaders did not do especially well on
these submarginal lands. 5
The allotment process sought to destroy Native American
governments by destroying their authority over tribal lands.86 If
individual Indians owned the lands, and if state or federal law governed
use and transfer, then tribal authority would vanish. 87 This was the
theory. So, in substance, the General Allotment Act had the avowed
purpose of destroying Native American governments, providing private
land ownership for individual Native Americans, and finally, subjecting
these lands to the jurisdiction of the state. And, not surprisingly,
taxation was one of the state powers that individual states were most
eager to exercise.'8
To the credit of the federal officials who devised this plan,
unrestricted ownership was not to occur immediately on these allotted
lands 89 because federal officials knew quite well that many nefarious
individuals were ready, willing, and able to cheat individual Native
Americans out of their lands. To offer some protection, the statute
restricted the sale of these lands for twenty-five years unless the federal
government approved the sale.19° In addition, these lands were exempt
183. See id. at 4 ("The tribal relations should be broken up, socialism destroyed, and the
family and the autonomy of the individual substituted.").
184. See DEBO, supra note 77, at 283.
185. See Charles M. Davis, Changes in Land Utilization on the Plateau of Northwestern
Colorado, 18 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 379 (1942) (describing unsustainable agricultural uses of
these semi-arid lands).
186. See COMMISSIONER'S REPORT OF 1889, supra note 182, at 4.
187. See id.
188. See General Allotment Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 6, 24 Stat. 388, 390 (subjecting
lands to state jurisdiction when they became unrestricted). Congress passed the Burke Act in
1906 to clarify the time at which state taxation could commence. See Act of May 8, 1906, ch.
2348, § 6, 34 Stat. 182, 182-83 (stating that restrictions on taxation would be removed when
the trust period ended and the individual Indian was issued a "patent in fee").
189. See General Allotment Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. at 389 (imposing a
twenty-five year trust period before an allottee would receive unrestricted ownership).
190. See id.
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from state taxation until the restrictions on sale were lifted.
Notwithstanding these restrictions, massive and unjust dispossessions
occurred.191
Until 1934, when Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act
(IRA), allotment occurred, surplus lands were sold, and allotted lands-
after restrictions were lifted-were sold. Not all reservations were
subject to allotment. 92 But those that were saw many tracts of land
within the reservation boundaries quickly pass into private ownership.
From 1887 to 1934, tribes lost two-thirds of their lands to the allotment
process (from 138 million acres to 47 million acres).' 93 In 1934 Congress
froze the allotment process because it concluded that it was an abysmal
failure in federal policy. 9"  With passage of the IRA, Congress
reaffirmed the political status of tribal governments and attempted to
promote self-government.95 Unfortunately, the allotment process left
many tribes substantially destroyed because tribal lands within
reservations were now in the hands of non-Indians. 19' These non-
Indians expected that any tribal government would have no authority
over them. Under allotment, this was the plan. But under the IRA,
tribal authority was supposed to be reconstituted.
97
The legacy of allotment, then, is a set of circumstances in which two
inconsistent federal policies, one contained in the General Allotment
Act and the other in the IRA, have left many tribes in a state of half
destruction and half reconstruction. And as we consider the power of
states over tribes and within Indian Country, we note that the purpose
of the General Allotment Act was to eliminate tribes as political entities
and subject Native Americans and their lands to state authority (and
taxation) once assimilation (the "final solution" to the "Indian
problem") was complete.
State taxation was an explicit concern of the allotment legislation. In
passing this legislation, Congress realized that state taxation of lands
owned by Native Americans would likely be used to extinguish title
through tax sales. The loss of these lands would frustrate the federal
191. See DEBO, supra note 77, at 268-83.
192. See id. at 283, 290-91.
193. See id. at 283.
194. See id. at 290.
195. See WASHBURN, supra no,: 74, at 254.
196. See DEBO, supra note 77, at 282.
197. See DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
INDIAN AFFAIRS 78-79 (1934) (The Indian Reorganization Act was intended to repair the
"incalculable damage done by the allotment policy.").
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policy of turning Native Americans into productive, responsible, and
God-fearing farmers. Accordingly, Congress preserved tax immunity98
of Native Americans and their lands during the transitional period that
would some day lead to total assimilation. These tax immunity rules
were merely an extension of the age-old practice of viewing Native
Americans who retained a politically separate relationship as beyond
the taxing authority of state governments. During this period of
transition, when Native Americans were not yet full-fledged members of
American society, it made sense not to subject their lands to state
taxation and to continue with the tradition of treating tribes and lands
within reservations as beyond the power of state taxation.
The whole point of the preceding discussion about the allotment
laws is to show that Congress, even as it attempted to destroy tribes
once and for all, still adhered to the principle that the political
separation of tribes and Native Americans placed them beyond the
reach of state taxation until the allotment and assimilation process was
complete. This is all the more clear when one considers the enabling
legislation for many of the western states. '99 Congress passed these
enabling statutes before, during, and after the allotment legislation." °
The enabling legislation provided immunity from taxation but also
acknowledged that Congress might some day remove such immunity."'
In any case, the allotment legislation and the enabling legislation
reaffirmed the tax immunity principle.
Left undecided by the allotment legislation was the state power to
tax non-Indians engaged in economic activities within a reservation.
Four cases from the late nineteenth century involved the power of a
territory to impose property taxes on railroads and cattle owners.02 The
United States Supreme Court decided these cases during the time that
federal policy strongly favored allotment and assimilation. In this
context, the Court paid little attention to the negative effects that these
decisions might have had on the tribes. For example, in Thomas v. Gay,
the most egregious case, the territorial taxation of non-Indian cattle
owners who had grazing leases with the tribe directly impaired the
198. See Act of May 8, 1906, ch. 2348, § 6, 34 Stat. 182, 182-83.
199. See COHEN, supra note 138, at 255-56.
200. See id. at 256 n.19 (giving examples of territory acts and state enabling legislation
imposing restrictions starting in 1861 and lasting until 1910).
201. See id. at 256.
202. See Wagoner v. Evans, 170 U.S. 588 (1898); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898);
Maricopa & Phoenix R.R. Co. v. Ariz. Territory, 156 U.S. 347 (1895); Utah & N. Ry. v.
Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885).
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leases because the costs of doing business for the cattle owners went up
and reduced their ability to make lease payments. For our purposes,
the cases are distinguishable because all the taxpayers were non-Indians.
States, however, disagree with this conclusion in the context of state
income taxation of non-member Indians living and working on anotherS 204
tribe's reservation. Some states contend that all non-members of a
tribe, whether or not they are Native Americans, are subject to state
income taxation.0 5 As a result, states are likely to rely on Thomas v.
Gay as authority that they can tax non-member Indians who live and
work on another tribe's reservation.
J. The Indian Citizenship Statutes
The Fourteenth Amendment did not extend citizenship to Native
Americans born in the United States if they retained their political
separation. The drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment used the phrase
"Indians not taxed" to describe Native Americans who remained
politically separate.2 °6 The allotment process was intended to destroy
tribes as governments, eliminate political separation, and extend
citizenship to Native Americans who had gone through the allotment
process and who had become assimilated.°7 As part of this assimilation
process, Congress passed citizenship provisions. Clearly, the federal
203. See Scott A. Taylor, A Judicial Framework for Applying Supreme Court
Jurisprudence to the State Income Taxation of Indian Traders, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 841,
857-58.
204. See, e.g., LaRock v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 621 N.W.2d 907, 908-09 (Wis. 2001)
(not relying on these cases, but concluding that any non-member, whether or not an Indian, is
subject to state income taxation even if she was formerly married to a member, is a member
of another tribe within the state, lives on the reservation, works for the tribe, and has children
who are members).
205. See id.
206. See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 99 (1884).
207. See General Allotment Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 6, 24 Stat. 388, 390.
208. See id. The text of the provision discloses the underlying assimilationist goals of the
General Allotment Act:
And every Indian born within the territorial limits of the United States
to whom allotments shall have been made under the provisions of this
act [General Allotment Act], or under any law or treaty, and every
Indian born within the territorial limits of the United States who has
voluntarily taken up, within said limits, his residence separate and
apart from any tribe of Indians therein, and has adopted the habits of
civilized life, is hereby declared to be a citizen of the United States,
and is entitled to all the rights, privileges, and immunities of such
citizens, whether said Indian has been or not, by birth or otherwise, a
member of any tribe of Indians within the territorial limits of the
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policy of allotment viewed citizenship as an important end point in the
assimilation process. As a practical matter, if all members of a tribe
proceeded through the allotment process and received citizenship, then
the tribe would have ceased to exist for lack of membership.
Elimination of the tribe, therefore, would have effectively eliminated
the political separation." ° Federal law explicitly removed limitations on
state taxation of Indians' lands that had gone through the end point of
the allotment process. 21' Allotment in practice, however, did not have
the intended effect of eliminating tribes, and allottees who had
received an unrestricted ownership and a certificate of competency
often retained tribal membership, which, in turn, led to judicial
confusion.213
United States without in any manner impairing or otherwise affecting
the right of any such Indian to tribal or other property.
Id.
209. See Act of March 3, 1901, ch. 868, 31 Stat. 1447 (amending section 6 of the General
Allotment Act of 1887 so that the allotment related citizenship rules applied to tribes located
within the Indian Territory, which later became encompassed with the admission of
Oklahoma in 1907); Act of May 8, 1906, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182, 182-83 (amending section 6 of
the General Allotment Act of 1887 to clarify that citizenship would not be conferred to an
allotment recipient until the Secretary of the Interior had made a determination of
competency to manage his own affairs).
210. The Supreme Court's decision in Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884), reflects the pre-
allotment paradigm. John Elk was a Native American who had voluntarily severed his ties to
his tribe and was effectively assimilated into white society. Id. at 95. No doubt out of racial
animus, an election official in Omaha, Nebraska, denied Mr. Elk the right to register to vote
because he was an Indian. See id. The United States Supreme Court upheld the state action
because Mr. Elk, who was a non-citizen by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment, had not
gone through the process of becoming naturalized. Id. at 102, 109. Elk v. Wilkins is especially
important for our purposes because it emphasizes the legal effects of political separation.
211. See Act of May 8, 1906, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182, 183 (Burke Act). Before Congress
passed the Burke Act in 1906, the tax collectors in Roberts County, South Dakota attempted
to impose property taxes on improvements located on a restricted allotment under the theory
that the General Allotment Act of 1887 immediately eliminated the separate political
existence of the tribe and exposed the land to the state's power to tax. The trial court placed
emphasis on the citizenship of the Indians. See United States v. Rickert, 106 F. 1, 6 (N.D.S.D.
1901). The United States Supreme Court, however, concluded that state taxation, if allowed
before the allotment process was concluded, would frustrate the federal policy of protecting
allottees from dispossession caused by state taxation. See United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S.
432, 438 (1903) ("To say that these lands may be assessed and taxed by the county of Roberts
under the authority of the State, is to say they may be sold for the taxes, and thus become so
burdened that the United States could not discharge its obligations to the Indians without
itself paying the taxes imposed from year to year, and thereby keeping the lands free from
incumbrances.").
212. See DEBO, supra note 77, at 283 (observing that "the Indian spirit is strong").
213. Compare In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 509 (1905) (finding that allotment, followed by
transfer of unrestricted title, and granting of citizenship terminated the status of a person as
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In 1919 and in 1924, Congress passed two Indian citizenship statutes
that were outside of the allotment process paradigm. The 1919 statute
granted citizenship to Native Americans who served in the military
during World War 1.214 And the 1924 statute granted citizenship to all
Native Americans born in the United States."' After 1924, the question
then became whether citizenship for all Native Americans extinguished
political separation and, therefore, permitted state taxation.
In 1943, without answering this question directly, the United States
Supreme Court placed significant, but not dispositive, weight on the
U.S. citizenship of three deceased Native Americans whose estates
Oklahoma had attempted to tax. In an opinion authored by Justice
Black in the case of Oklahoma Tax Commission v. United States, the
Court noted:
Congress has passed laws under which Indians have
become full-fledged citizens of the State of Oklahoma.
Oklahoma supplies for them and their children schools,
roads, courts, police protection and all the other benefits
of an ordered society. Citizens of Oklahoma must pay
for these benefits. If some pay less, others must pay
216
more.
In the opinion, Justice Black attempted to compare this case with the
clear political separation case of Worcester v. Georgia:
Although there are remnants of the form of tribal
sovereignty, these Indians have no effective tribal
autonomy as in Worcester v. Georgia... ; and, unlike the
Indians involved in The Kansas Indians case,... they are
actually citizens of the State with little to distinguish
them from all other citizens except for their limited
property restrictions and their tax exemptions. Their
lands are held in fee, not in trust, as in the Rickert case,
and the doctrine of constitutional immunity from
an Indian), with United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 599 (1916) (reading section 6 of the
General Allotment Act of 1887 and its granting of citizenship as not extinguishing the
existence of the tribe and noting that citizenship does not remove federal power over tribes or
their members).
214. See Act of Nov. 6, 1919, ch. 95, 41 Stat. 350.
215. See Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253.
216. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598, 608-09 (1943) (citations
omitted).
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taxation for the income of their holdings on the federal
instrumentality theory has been renounced .... 217
States could argue that the granting of citizenship to all Native
Americans in 1924 eliminated political separation and subjected Native
Americans to state income taxation even when they live and work
within the territorial boundaries of their tribe. A more reasonable
reading of the case, however, is that state taxation is appropriate when
no federal law preempts taxation for activity not connected with a tribe
or its reservation. The Oklahoma Tax Commission case involved an
Oklahoma estate tax on the estates of deceased Native Americans
whose wealth was held in trust by the United States.218 The assets
included funds and allotted lands that were still subject to restrictions.219
The Court acknowledged that the restricted lands were exempt from
taxation by federal statute but that the funds and other personal
property, no longer having a direct connection with the allotted lands,
were not.2 °
Before the beginning of allotment, the universally accepted
paradigm was that Native Americans living in Indian Country were
exempt from state and federal taxation. 22' The federal policy of
allotment and assimilation envisioned the end of tribes and the
beginning of state taxation of Native Americans and their lands.222
Initially, the allotment policy would include a period of transition that
would take twenty-five years. 23  During this transition period, tribes
would continue to exist and allotted lands would be exempt from
taxation. 2 '  The twenty-five year period was extended 25 and then
abandoned altogether in 1934 with the enactment of the Indian
217. Id. at 603 (citations omitted).
218. Id. at 599.
219. Id. at 600 n.1.
220. Id. at 611-12.
221. See Method of Determining "Indians Not Taxed," supra note 129, at 992, 994.
222. See Act of May 8, 1906, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182, 182-83 (amending the General
Allotment Act to clarify that states could not tax allotments until the restrictions were lifted,
which, by implication, meant that states could tax these lands after the lifting of these
restrictions); Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103 (1998)
(allowing the imposition of county property tax on land owned by the Tribe within its own
reservation because the land had originally been allotted and had the restrictions removed).
223. See General Allotment Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388, 389-90.
224. See Taylor, supra note 123, at 65-70.
225. See id. at 66-67.
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Reorganization Act.226 In the Oklahoma Tax Commission case, the
Court had to address the details of state taxation during the interim
period. Justice Black reasoned that once the political identity of the
tribe was gone, or nearly gone, state taxation involving off-reservation
assets should have been permissible in the absence of an explicit federal
prohibition.227
Justice Murphy's dissent, however, showed a willingness to imply a
tax exemption from the nature of the federal relationship with the
specific Native Americans.228 Justice Murphy viewed the federal holding
of the assets as evidence of a federal guardian/ward relationship that
state taxation would impair or frustrate.229 He saw this as preempting
the state's power to tax.230 Ironically, Justice Murphy's logic of an
implied federal preemption of the state power to tax would be used by
Justice Black to invalidate Arizona's attempt to impose a state sales tax
on a licensed Indian trader.3
Taken together, the citizenship statutes and the decision in
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. United States do not provide states with a
legal basis for taxing activity within Indian Country. In connection with
our issue of state income taxation of non-member Indians, we will see
that states do not rely on United States citizenship. Instead, they point
to the lack of membership in the tribe on whose reservation the non-
member Indian lives and works.
III. THE MODERN CASES
A. The United States Supreme Court Cases
Based on the extensive legal history of Native Americans, which
dates from colonial times, it would seem axiomatic that Native
Americans within reservations are beyond the power of state taxation.
226. See id. at 68-69.
227. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598, 603 (1943).
228. See id. at 612-13 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
229. See id. at 619.
230. See id. at 619-20, where Justice Murphy stated that "when Congress imposed
restrictions upon Indian property, it meant, and was saying in effect, that the property was
exempt from state taxation while the restrictions continue or until Congress waives the
immunity."
231. See Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 686 (1965)
(Federal regulation of the Indian traders was sufficient to preempt state taxation even though
the relevant federal statutes provided no explicit exemption.). Justice Black did not cite
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. United States, presumably because of the inconsistency in logic.
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Nonetheless, states have remained ever-optimistic that the passage of
time, and time alone, can change the law.232 For example, Arizona and
its taxing authority believed that Rosalind McClanahan, a member,
resident, and employee of the Navajo Nation, should pay the Arizona
income tax on her wages paid by the tribe.23 The logic of the state was
simple: she lived within Arizona and had income;2 11 therefore, she owed
Arizona income tax. The state tax authority argued, and the Arizona
Court of Appeals held, that Ms. McClanahan could escape the Arizona
income tax only if she could point to an exemption in the state tax
statute or in a federal law specifically preempting the state's power to
impose an income tax. 35 The Arizona court acknowledged that a state
tax that infringed the sovereignty of the Navajo Nation could be
invalid. 236 The court, however, found that state income tax did not fall
on the Navajo Nation and, therefore, had no adverse impact on the
tribe. 237 The court acknowledged that the state enabling statute and the
state's constitution prohibited state taxation of Indian lands. 38  The
court, however, concluded that this prohibition extended only to lands
and not to income 3 9 In this sense, the passage of time was on the state's
side because no states had an income tax in 1910 when Congress passed
the enabling legislation that permitted Arizona to be admitted to the
Union.2 '0 Therefore, Congress, having in mind state efforts to tax Indian
232. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Okla. Tax
Comm'n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598 (1943); The New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761
(1866); The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866).
233. See McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Ariz., 484 P.2d 221, 222-23 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1971) ("[T]he relationship of the Indian, be he reservation oriented or otherwise, to the
rest of the citizens of the United States and to the states themselves, has drastically changed
in the approximate 140 years since Worcester v. Georgia.").
234. See id. at 222 (noting that the taxpayer, a member and resident of the Navajo
Nation, was also a resident of Arizona).
235. See id. at 225 (considering the federal enabling legislation that prohibits state
property taxation and reasoning that the federal prohibition did apply to Arizona's income
tax).
236. See id. at 223.
237. See id. at 224 (focusing on the imposition of the income tax on Ms. McClanahan
instead of the exercise of state power and its negative effect on the Navajo Nation's right of
self-government).
238. See id. at 225.
239. See id.
240. The Arizona state enabling legislation was enacted in 1910. See Act of June 20,
1910, ch. 310, § 20, 36 Stat. 557, 569-70 (prohibiting state jurisdiction and state taxation of
Indian reservation lands unless authorized by Congress). Wisconsin was the first state to
impose an income tax in 1911. See W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, JR., PROGRESSIVISM AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE WISCONSIN INCOME TAX 1911-1929, at 42 (1974).
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lands, obviously did not think about extending the immunity to state
income taxes.
Arizona's argument was one that states usually make when asserting
authority over Indian Country. States assert that they have general
legislative authority within their political boundaries and that any tribes
are subject to such authority unless Congress otherwise prohibits its
exercise. Georgia adopted the same rationale 140 years earlier when it
attempted to legislate the Cherokee Nation out of existence."' But in
Worcester v. Georgia, the United States Supreme Court held that the
legislative power of Georgia, even when it involved a non-Indian, did
not extend into Indian Country.242
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the Supreme Court's opinion in
McClanahan and used a rationale very similar to the one used by Justice
John Marshall in Worcester. In Worcester, Georgia's legislative power
stopped at the reservation boundary and could not cross it to regulate
the behaviors of people within the Cherokee Nation.2 43 In the Worcester
case, the Georgia statute in question made it a crime for Samuel
Worcester to enter the Cherokee Nation without a permit issued by the
State of Georgia.2 ' The Georgia statute was both civil and criminal in
nature-similar to the current regime of all states making it mandatory
for drivers of motor vehicles to obtain a driver's license or face a
criminal penalty for driving without a license. The law applied
principally to non-Indians and was designed to cut off trade with the
Cherokee Nation.245  Justice John Marshall's analysis was
straightforward. The Cherokee Nation was a political entity existing
before the arrival of Europeans. The Cherokee Nation negotiated
treaties with the United States. The United States passed laws
regarding relations with the Cherokee Nation and other Indian tribes.
This federal regime of treaties and statutes left no room for the states to
241. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
242. See id.
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of
Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no
right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in
conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress.
Id.
243. See id.
244. See id. at 539.
245. See DEBO, supra note 77, at 104-06.
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exercise legislative authority. 246 Federal law recognized the sovereignty
of the Cherokee Nation, and federal law, under the Federal
Constitution, preempted the Georgia legislation.
47
Justice Thurgood Marshall, in McClanahan, reiterated the
importance of federal preemption.2 48  He looked at the treaties and
relevant federal legislation. 24 9 He also recognized the importance of the
Navajo Nation's sovereignty and included this as an important
consideration, primarily because the Navajo Nation, like the Cherokee
Nation, had a political identity that existed before the arrival of the
Europeans and also had entered into treaties with the United States.250
He noted, however, that twentieth century Supreme Court cases had
2511
given states latitude over non-Indians within Indian Country.
A careful reading of his opinion shows that Justice Thurgood
Marshall's use of the phrase "reservation Indians" refers to Indians who
were within Indian Country whether or not they were members of a
particular tribe. This is demonstrated by his reference to federal
criminal jurisdiction in which the federal government, and not the state
government, asserts criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed within
Indian Country (1) by one Indian against another Indian or (2) by or
against an Indian and involving a non-Indian. In these cases, the federal
criminal jurisdiction arose so long as the person was an Indian. The
specific tribal membership of the Indian was unimportant.5 2 Under the
246. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561-63.
247. See id.
248. See McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973).
We hold that by imposing the tax in question on this appellant, the State
has interfered with matters which the relevant treaty and statutes leave to
the exclusive province of the Federal Government and the Indians
themselves. The tax is therefore unlawful as applied to reservation
Indians with income derived wholly from reservation sources.
Id.
249. See id. at 173-74.
250. See id. at 168.
251. See id. at 172.
252. See id. at 171. Justice Marshall relied on Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959),
which emphasized that "if the crime was by or against an Indian, tribal jurisdiction or that
expressly conferred on other courts by Congress has remained exclusive." The Court in
Williams v. Lee relied on the decision of Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 252 (1913),
which involved federal jurisdiction over a murder on the Hoopa Valley Reservation of a man
who was a member of the Klamath Tribe. The federal statute in question merely referred to
the murder of an Indian within Indian Country and not to his membership in the specific
tribe. Donnelly, 228 U.S. at 254. The facts in the Donnelly case indicate that the phrase
"reservation Indian" means an Indian who is on a reservation whether or not he is a member.
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relevant statutes, the federal policy of excluding state authority over
Indians within Indian Country, irrespective of tribal membership, was
quite clear. 53
So, when Justice Thurgood Marshall concluded that the state power
to tax did not extend to on-reservation activities of "reservation
Indians," he clearly meant Indians who were members of the tribe and
also those Indians who were members of other tribes. Federal law 2 ' and
tribal law255 often draw legitimate distinctions between Indians and non-
Indians, especially in the hiring of employees. Most tribes find within
their boundaries Indians who are members of other tribes. The
historical record shows that intermarriage, trade, removal, the
reservation system, and wars frequently caused the intermingling of
Indians from different tribes.256 In more recent times, intermingling
comes about because tribes and the federal government hire
professionals who are Native Americans from other tribes.2 7  In
addition, intermarriage among Native Americans continues to
contribute to intermingling.258
This distinction becomes important when we consider the effect of Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S.
676 (1990), and the federal legislation that superseded the holding in Duro. See discussion
infra notes 310-44.
253. See, e.g., Donnelly, 228 U.S. at 252 (The term "Indian" in the Major Crimes Act
included an Indian who was on the Hoopa Valley Reservation but was a member of the
Klamath Tribe.).
254. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554-55 (1974) (upholding the validity of
the Indian preference in hiring by the Bureau of Indian Affairs).
255. See Brendan O'Dell, Comment, Judicial Rewriting of Indian Employment
Preferences-A Case Comment: E.E.O.C. v. Peabody Western Coal Company, 400 F.3d 774
(9th Cir. 2005), 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 187, 197-98 (2006) (discussing Navajo law that
required certain employers to follow a Navajo preference in hiring employees).
256. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 567-58 (1846) (involving a
white man who married a Cherokee woman and whom the Cherokee Nation adopted into the
tribe); ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 136-37 (5th ed. 2007) (describing some examples of tribal separations,
amalgamations, and consolidations); RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS:
CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO COURT 49-51 (2d prtg. 1982) (describing the effect of
intermarriage and the role Cherokee members played in leadership roles of the Tribe);
Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Of Native Americans and Tribal Members: The Impact of Law on
Indian Group Life, 28 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 1123, 1140 (1994) (describing the practice of some
tribes taking prisoners of war from other tribes and then integrating them into their own
communities).
257. See, e.g., N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't v. Greaves, 864 P.2d 324, 325 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1993) (describing a taxpayer who was a member of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe in South
Dakota but lived and worked, as a tribal judge, on the reservation of the Jicarilla Apache
Tribe in New Mexico).
258. See, e.g., LaRock v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 621 N.W.2d 907, 908-09 (Wis. 2001)
(describing a taxpayer who was a member of the Menominee Tribe who married a member of
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Justice Marshall indicated that state authority should not infringe
tribal sovereignty."' But he did not indicate that such infringement was
a categorical bar.2'6 Instead, he stated that it should be the backdrop in
which federal preemption is implied.6  In looking at infringement, he
emphasized that the right of native peoples to govern themselves was
important. 262  Many non-member Indians play pivotal governmental
roles on reservations where they live and work. Although the facts in
McClanahan involved a person who was a member of the Navajo tribe,
it is clear that Justice Marshall was speaking broadly in a context in
which the term "reservation Indian" included Indians who were
members of other tribes.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in McClanahan, appellate
courts in Minnesota, 26 Montana, 26' New Mexico, 26' and North Dakota266
all considered whether the holding in McClanahan extended to Indians
who lived and worked on the reservations of other tribes. The appellate
courts of all four states, after a careful reading of McClanahan,
concluded the obvious: "reservation Indian" meant an Indian living and
the Oneida Tribe, where she lived and worked).
259. See McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1973).
260. See id. at 172.
261. See id. ("The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not because it provides a
definitive resolution of the issues in this suit, but because it provides a backdrop against which
the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read.").
262. See id. ("It must always be remembered that the various Indian tribes were once
independent and sovereign nations, and that their claim to sovereignty long predates that of
our own Government.").
263. See Topash v. Comm'r of Revenue, 291 N.W.2d 679, 680, 683 (Minn. 1980) (finding
that a member of the Tulalip Tribe in Washington who lived and worked for the Bureau of
Indian Affairs on the reservation of the Red Lake Band of the Chippewa Indians in
Minnesota was not subject to the Minnesota income tax because the term "reservation
Indian" as used in McClanahan included Indians who were members of other tribes).
264. See LaRoque v. State, 583 P.2d 1059, 1060, 1064-65 (Mont. 1978) (One of the
taxpayers in this consolidated case was a member of the Turtle Mountain Chippewa Tribe in
North Dakota married to a member of the Assiniboine-Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck
Reservation in Montana where he lived and worked; the court held that the holding in
McClanahan extended to him.).
265. See Fox v. Bureau of Revenue, 531 P.2d 1234, 1234-36 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975)
(finding that a member of the Comanche Tribe in Oklahoma was exempt from the New
Mexico income tax when she lived and worked on the New Mexico portion of the Navajo
Nation).
266. See White Eagle v. Dorgan, 209 N.W.2d 621, 622-24 (N.D. 1973) (One of the
taxpayers in this consolidated case was a member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe but
lived and worked in the Standing Rock Tribe; the court applied the holding of McClanahan to
him.).
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working on a reservation. Two other states, Oregon167 and Idaho,2 6
enacted statutory exemptions that extended the holding of McClanahan
to non-member Indians who live and work on another tribe's
reservation. California issued a ruling extending McClanahan's holding
to non-member Indians. 269 Following these four state court decisions,
the two state statutory provisions, and the California ruling, the question
seemed well-settled until the Supreme Court decided Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation.270
Seven years after its McClanahan decision, the Supreme Court, in
Colville, took up a complicated case involving state taxation of cigarette
sales on three Indian reservations within the State of Washington.27'
Most of the issues in the case have little relevance to the question of
state income taxation of non-member Indians. One issue in the case,
however, seems to address the question quite directly. Washington
asserted that its cigarette tax, which applied to the buyer of the
cigarettes, applied to Indian purchasers who resided on the reservation
where the cigarettes were sold but who were not enrolled members of
that tribe.272 Justice White, the author of the Court's opinion, saw no
federal statute that preempted such taxation, nor did he see any way in
which the tax infringed the particular tribe's sovereignty. 273 He saw the
non-member Indians as occupying the same position as non-Indians.274
267. See OR. REV. STAT. § 316.777 (2007); Or. Dep't of Revenue, Exempt Income
Schedule for Enrolled Members of a Federally Recognized Indian Tribe (2006), available at
http://www.oregon.gov/DOR/PERTAX/docs/101-687.pdf (providing income exemption that
includes a non-member Indian who is a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe and
also lives and works on an Indian reservation within Oregon).
268. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-3026A(4)(b)(iv) (2007) (providing that state income
tax exemption extends to a non-member Indian living and working on an Indian reservation
within Idaho if he or she is a member of any federally recognized Indian tribe).
269. See Calif. Franchise Tax Bd., Legal Ruling No. 399 (1977) (withdrawn without
explanation), available at http://www.ftb.ca.gov/law/rulings/Withdrawn/lr399.pdf (providing
income taxation to any reservation Indian irrespective of tribal membership).
270. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
271. See id. at 138.
272. See id. at 160.
273. See id.
274. See id. at 161.
For most practical purposes those [non-member] Indians stand on the
same footing as non-Indians resident on the reservation. There is no
evidence that nonmembers have a say in tribal affairs or significantly
share in tribal disbursements. We find, therefore, that the State's interest
in taxing these purchasers outweighs any tribal interest that may exist in
preventing the State from imposing its taxes.
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An ever-present conceptual backdrop to Justice White's entire analysis
was his observation that the tribes were attempting to use their special
tax status to market a tax exemption. 275  He noted that the tribes
imported untaxed cigarettes and then sold them at a lower price mostly
to customers who did not live on the reservation.276 He saw no
significant federal policy or tribal interest in such endeavors.7 Instead,
he preferred activities on the reservation that added value or created
wealth.278  He definitively said that the taxation issue would be an
entirely different kettle of fish if the tribes were engaged in an activity in
which labor and capital were significantly involved in producing goods
279
or services.
To be fair to the tribes, we must concede that the practice of
marketing a tax exemption outside of Indian Country is quite common
whenever a political boundary creates a meaningful tax differential. If
the political boundary is the United States and Canada 28° or between
states,8 then "marketing a tax exemption" is legally acceptable because
the Supreme Court either has no jurisdiction or is disinterested in
coming up with a legal theory to stop it. In fact, the Supreme Court,
under a due process line of analysis, permits tax-free interstate
catalogue, mail-order, and internet sales of goods.282 The tax avoided in
such cases is the sales tax of the buyer's state. These taxes are in the five
to nine percent range and are substantial enough to have led many
consumers to buy computers from Dell and clothes from L.L. Bean.
Id.
275. See id. at 155.
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. See id. at 156-57 ("While the Tribes do have an interest in raising revenues for
essential governmental programs, that interest is strongest when the revenues are derived
from value generated on the reservation by activities involving the Tribes and when the
taxpayer is the recipient of tribal services.").
279. See id.
280. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Statement of Robert A. Robinson, Cigarette
Smuggling: Information on Interstate and U.S.-Canadian Activity 1 (1998), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/rc98182t.pdf (describing the smuggling that results from the
lower tax on cigarettes sold in the United States).
281. See, e.g., Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause
Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARv. L. REV. 377 (1996) (concluding
that states are largely free to market their tax exemptions because dormant commerce clause
jurisprudence applies to discriminatory taxation on interstate commerce and not to the
granting of exemptions, waivers, or tax holidays).
282. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 301-02 (1992); Eric A. Ess,
Comment, Internet Taxation Without Physical Representation?: States Seek Solution to Stop E-
Commerce Sales Tax Shortfall, 50 ST. Louis U. L.J. 893, 894-95 (2006).
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Readers of this Article will note that when they buy a computer at Best
Buy they very likely will have to pay a substantial sales tax. But if they
buy it from Dell, except in those states where Dell has a nexus, no tax
will be charged or collected. I point this out for the benefit of the
reader, lest the reader conclude that the tribes in the Colville case were
engaged in some new scheme that had never succeeded before. In any
case, the marketing of a tax exemption was a key point in Justice
White's analysis.
In addition, Justice White considered whether any specific federal
statutes preempted state taxation of tribal cigarette sales to non-
member Indians living on the tribe's reservation.283 His mistake here is
quite obvious. He was looking for a statute that said: "States, you can't
tax non-member Indians." Unfortunately, he forgot that Congress does
not work that way. Treaties rarely mentioned tax matters because
everyone knew that state taxes did not apply within Indian Country. 4
Some federal legislation mentioned tax matters involving Indians when
a particular problem arose. So, for example, the enabling statute of
Washington contains a prohibition against state taxation of Indian
lands.285 This provision arose because Kansas and New York had tried
illegally to tax Indian lands in the 1860s,286 and new states needed a
reminder that they could not do that. There are some other instances of
federal legislation, but cumulatively they do not provide a specific
exemption for every state tax.
The McClanahan case is a good example of how the federal
preemption law works. No specific treaty or law said that Arizona (or
states generally) could impose their income taxes on reservation
Indians.78 Nonetheless, Justice Marshall read the totality of the treaties
and federal legislation as having a general preemptive effect.' Given
this approach, Arizona had to point to a specific piece of federal
legislation authorizing its income taxation of reservation Indians. 9 It
could point to no such statute, and, accordingly, it lost its case in the
Supreme Court. In Colville, Washington should have been required to
283. See Colville, 447 U.S. at 155.
284. See Taylor, supra note 123, 59-64.
285. See Colville, 447 U.S. at 156 (citing the enabling statute, Act of Feb. 22, 1889, 25
Stat. 676).
286. See The New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1866); The Kansas Indians, 72
U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866).
287. See McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 167-71 (1973).
288. See id. at 173.
289. See id. at 178-79.
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do the same-point to a federal statute authorizing state taxation of
non-member Indians. Had there been such a statute, the case would not
have made its way to the Supreme Court because everyone would have
known that such a statute controlled the outcome. Instead, Justice
White viewed the "smokeshops" as an illegitimate marketing of a tax
exemption 2' and, therefore, could not see any tribal interest being
served by allowing such an exemption.291
Justice White was also mistaken in treating non-member Indians the
same as non-Indians. It is very significant that the Colville Reservation
itself is an amalgamation of more than one tribe brought together by the
process of federal dispossession of their lands.292  This intermingling
reflects general historical forces that caused many members of different
tribes to find themselves together on a single reservation. The process
of sorting out these intermixings is an essential attribute of tribal
sovereignty. Justice White ignored these historical facts generally and
specifically. He saw non-member Indians as having no role in the life,
culture, society, or government of the tribe. Justice White also was
wrong in assuming that non-member Indians play no role in tribal
affairs. The state cases decided in Minnesota,293 Montana ,294 New
Mexico29' and North Dakota2 96 prove the opposite 'to be true. In each of
those cases, the non-member Indians, on whom state authorities
attempted to impose their income taxes, played meaningful roles in the
life and affairs of each tribe.29
290. See Colville, 447 U.S. at 155.
291. See id. at 156-57.
292. See Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, This Is Our True Story: A
Walk Through Time, http://www.colvilletribes.com/past.htm (last visited May 14, 2008).
293. See Topash v. Comm'r of Revenue, 291 N.W.2d 679, 680 (Minn. 1980) (Mr. Topash
was a member of the Tulalip Tribe; he lived on the reservation of the Red Lake Band of
Chippewa Indians and worked for the Bureau of Indian Affairs.).
294. See LaRoque v. State, 583 P.2d 1059, 1060 (Mont. 1978) (The facts are sparse but
indicate that Mr. LaRoque was a member of the Turtle Mountain Tribe in North Dakota and
lived with his wife, who was a member of the Assiniboine-Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck
Reservation in Montana.).
295. See, e.g., N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't v. Greaves, 864 P.2d 324, 325 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1993) (The taxpayer was a member of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe in South Dakota but
lived and worked, as a tribal judge, on the reservation of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe in New
Mexico.).
296. See White Eagle v. Dorgan, 209 N.W.2d 621, 622 (N.D. 1973). Joseph F. Condon
was a member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe in South Dakota and lived on the North
Dakota side of the Standing Rock Reservation, where he worked for the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, a fact not reflected in the case but revealed to this author from conversations with
people who knew Mr. Condon before he passed away.
297. See LaRock v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 621 N.W.2d 907, 908-09 (Wis. 2001) (holding
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When the Supreme Court considers this issue, it will have to decide
whether the holding in Colville extends to the state income taxation of
non-member Indians who live and work on reservations of which they
are not enrolled members. Given the natural conservatism of the Court
as a political institution, it is more comfortable distinguishing a case than
overturning it.
The most obvious factor that distinguishes Colville from the state
income tax cases is that the latter never have involved an instance of a
tribe that is marketing a tax exemption. We do not have a situation
where tribes recruit non-member Indians to live on their reservations so
that they can avoid the state income tax. These cases show that the non-
member Indian lives on another reservation for family and employment
reasons. Often the non-member Indian is married to a member, works
for the tribe, works for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, or runs a business
providing goods and services. The tribal and federal interests are critical
to the tribe, its population, its culture, and its governance.
This is not a case of non-member Indians sitting around, watching
television, and smoking cheap tax-free cigarettes, which is probably the
picture that Justice White had in his mind in Colville. Justice White
noted that "[t]here is no evidence that nonmembers [who are Indians]
have a say in tribal affairs or significantly share in tribal
disbursements."29 8 Justice White suggested that it was a factual question.
On this important question, he allowed the lack of evidence to prove the
lack of a tribal interest. Justice White was deciding the question of state
taxation of non-member Indians as an issue of first impression in which
there was no pre-existing standard. In fact, McClanahan and the four
state income tax cases, all of which had been decided before Colville,
reflected an apparent consensus that states could not tax on-reservation
Indians for on-reservation activity even if the Indian was a member of
another tribe. Accordingly, the Court should have remanded this part
of the case for further factual findings to determine the role that non-
member Indians played on the various reservations. It is
understandable that the tribes in the case presented no evidence at the
trial level because the evidentiary requirement was unknown until
Justice White created it. The Court did not remand for further factual
in favor of state income taxation of Ms. LaRock even though she lived and worked on the
reservation of the Oneida Nation, worked for the tribe, had married (and later divorced) an
Oneida tribal member, and had two children who were members of the Oneida Nation).
298. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447
U.S. 134, 161 (1980).
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findings."9
The reported cases on state income taxation of non-member Indians
paint a totally different picture. These non-member Indians are raising
families, working hard for the tribal or federal government, and
providing vital goods and services. Common sense tells us that
intermarriage outside of a tribe with a small membership is a genetic
imperative. 3°° Also, some tribes have adopted membership rules that
allow membership for children of mixed marriages when one parent is a
member of the tribe and the other parent is a member of another
federally recognized Indian tribe.3"" No matter how we cut it, marketing
a tax exemption is not part of the plot of any of these state income tax
stories involving non-member Indians.
In a subsequent case involving Indian gaming, Justice White
demonstrated how California's power to regulate high-stakes bingo
hinged on whether the tribe was attempting to market its exemption
from California's bingo regulations. The underlying facts in California
v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians 2 are quite simple. The tribe began
conducting bingo games on the reservation under a tribal ordinance that
the Bureau of Indian Affairs had approved.30 3  The key to the
operation's success was the size of the prizes that bingo players could
win. In California, by operation of state law, a bingo prize could not
exceed $250.304 The tribe, however, offered much larger prizes, which
attracted more players and, understandably, resulted in commercial
success. California, asserting power to regulate the tribe's bingo
operations, claimed that the tribe was marketing its exemption just as
the tribes had done with cigarette sales in Colville. Justice White
disagreed. He found that the bingo operation, to be successful, required
substantial investments of labor and capital. Having concluded that the
tribe was not marketing an exemption, Justice White held that
California could not regulate the tribe's bingo operations and was
without legal authority to force the tribe to limit its prizes to $250.' 6
299. Id. at 164.
300. See Alan H. Bittles & James V. Neel, The Costs of Human Inbreeding and Their
Implications for Variations at the DNA Level, 8 NATURE GENETICS 117 (1994).
301. See STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 93-94 (3d ed.
2002).
302. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
303. See id. at 204-05.
304. See id. at 205.
305. See id. at 219.
306. See id. at 219-22.
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The Cabazon case caused states to fear that tribes would begin or
expand gaming operations. Congress responded quickly with the
passage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,3° which now provides a
shared role for tribes, states, and the federal government. A state has a
role because the statute requires tribes and states to negotiate gaming
compacts, which then serve as an intergovernmental agreement in which
the state can protect its interest.3°
If we read Colville and Cabazon together, we can conclude that the
absence of a tribe marketing an exemption definitely changes the
analysis. State income taxation of non-member Indians will almost
never involve the marketing of a tax exemption. It is unlikely that a
non-member Indian would move to a different tribe for the sole purpose
of avoiding imposition of a state income tax. This would only be
worthwhile for relatively high income taxpayers. Outside of Indian
Country, Florida is a state that markets its exemption from state income
taxation. It can offer residence to taxpayers from states with high
income taxes." This works very well for retirees. But it will not work
for Indian Country because Florida, Texas, and Nevada have already
cornered the market. Those states have legal certainty in marketing
their tax exemption. Tribes, on the other hand, are much more
interested in promoting a healthy environment, good education, and job
opportunities for those living on their reservations. As a result, states,
[T]he Tribes are not merely importing a product onto the reservations for
immediate resale to non-Indians. They have built modem facilities which
provide recreational opportunities and ancillary services to their patrons,
who do not simply drive onto the reservations, make purchases and
depart, but spend extended periods of time there enjoying the services the
Tribes provide.
Id. at 219.
307. See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988)
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2006)).
308. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d).
309. I was attending a cocktail reception for our law school's Board of Governors. One
of the members of the Board had a complicated tax question and the dean directed him to
me. The look on the dean's face suggested that I should be helpful to this Board member.
The Board member and I talked, he gave me his card, and I said I would get back to him. I
noticed that his card gave a Florida address for someone whose family and professional life
had been spent in Minnesota. Before he left, I said, "Oh, you live in Florida. There's no
income tax in Florida, unlike Minnesota, which has a high income tax." He said, "That's why
I moved there." Other states with no income tax include Texas and Nevada. The first
President Bush maintained his residence in Texas throughout his presidency, instead of
Maine, where he actually owned a house at the time and where he probably spent more time.
Texas has no income tax but Maine does. His tax returns show that he paid no income tax to
Maine.
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when they assert the power to tax the income of non-member Indians,
should have to prove that a particular tribe is marketing a tax exemption
when it permits a particular non-member Indian to reside within its
reservation boundaries.
Three years after Cabazon, the Supreme Court decided Duro v.
Reina."° Duro involved the question of tribal criminal jurisdiction over
a non-member Indian named Albert Duro. The Court had addressed
the same issue twelve years earlier when the question of tribal criminal
jurisdiction involved a non-member, non-Indian."' In the Duro case, the
criminal defendant was a member of the Torres-Martinez Band of
Cahuilla Mission Indians of California. 2 Mr. Duro was living on the
reservation of the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community of
Arizona and had a job working for a company owned by the tribe.1 3
While on the Salt River Reservation, he allegedly shot a fourteen-year-
old boy who was a member of the Gila River Indian Tribe. Under the
Major Crimes Act, the United States had criminal jurisdiction over Mr.
Duro.315  He was arrested in California by federal agents, but the
indictment against him was dismissed. 16 After returning to Salt River,
Mr. Duro was arrested and charged with the illegal firing of a weapon
on the reservation, which under federal law at the time could not carry a
fine of more than $500 or imprisonment of more than six months.3 7 Mr.
Duro filed a writ of habeas corpus with the federal court, which granted
the writ.38  The case ultimately made its way to the United States
Supreme Court. The Court held that the tribal court of the Salt River
Pima-Maricopa Indian Community did not have criminal jurisdiction
over Mr. Duro. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Kennedy, writing for
the majority, had the occasion to consider the tax status of non-member
Indians and relied on the decision in the Colville case.1 9 He emphasized
310. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
311. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194 (1978) (holding that the
tribe did not have criminal jurisdiction over a non-Indian who committed crimes on the
reservation).
312. See Duro, 495 U.S. at 679.
313. See id.
314. See id.
315. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006).
316. See Duro, 495 U.S. at 679-80.
317. See id. at 681.
318. See id. at 681-82.
319. See id. at 686-87.
The distinction between members and nonmembers and its relation to
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that in Colville non-member Indians had the same tax status (not
exempt from state cigarette tax) as non-Indians. He was reasoning by
analogy and asserting that non-member Indians should be treated the
same as non-Indians.
Justice Kennedy's reliance on Colville is inappropriate because (1)
Justice White ended up treating non-member Indians the same as non-
Indians, (2) the tribe was marketing a tax exemption, and (3) there was
no evidence showing the non-member Indians played an important role
within the tribe.
If we evaluate Duro's use of Colville in light of Cabazon, we see that
Justice Kennedy's logic is faulty. In Cabazon, where the tribe was not
marketing an exemption, the Court prohibited the application of
California gaming law when most of the bingo players were non-Indian,
non-residents of the Cabazon Band. The whole purpose of the gaming
operation was to bring mostly non-Indians to the reservation to play
bingo on Sunday afternoons. In that case, the tribal and federal interest
in promoting economic development was sufficient to oust California of
its regulatory power. In addition, we should look at the facts in Duro.
We should ask whether the tribe had an interest in promoting law and
order in the case of a man who was a non-member Indian who lived on
the reservation and worked for one of the tribe's businesses. The
answer seems so very clear that criminal jurisdiction in Mr. Duro's case
was core to the tribe's ability to maintain and encourage a safe
community.
Underlying Justice Kennedy's rationale is the unexpressed
assumption that membership in a political entity is the justification for
the exercise of criminal jurisdiction or taxing power. Many examples
prove his logic false. So, for example, when Justice Kennedy travels to
London to teach a summer course for an American law school, he is
required to pay the British value-added tax on goods and services he
self-governance is recognized in other areas of Indian law. Exemption
from state taxation for residents of a reservation, for example, is
determined by tribal membership, not by reference to Indians as a general
class. We have held that States may not impose certain taxes on
transactions of tribal members on the reservation because this would
interfere with internal governance and self-determination. But this
rationale does not apply to taxation of nonmembers, even where they are
Indians ....
Id. (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
160-61 (1980); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976);
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973)).
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purchases, which would include food and lodging. In addition, his
earnings are subject to the British income tax unless exempted by
statute or treaty. Likewise, his conduct is subject to British criminal
jurisdiction. All the while, he is also subject to federal and state taxation
because of citizenship and residence. While in Britain, he cannot vote in
local, national, or European elections because he is and remains a
United States citizen and not a subject of the United Kingdom. His
position as a Justice of the United States Supreme Court effectively
prohibits him from accepting citizenship in another country.
320
Another rationale of Justice Kennedy's opinion is that tribes cannot
exercise criminal jurisdiction because their dependent status limits their
311
sovereignty. Why this is so is unclear. A tribe, as a government,
originally had the authority, like any government, to provide law and
order for its members. Treaties have not diminished this power nor has
Congress provided otherwise. To find a lack of tribal power, Justice
Kennedy relied on the much contested "implicit divesture" doctrine,
which Justice Rehnquist developed in Oliphant.32 2 Under this doctrine,
tribes, as determined by the United States Supreme Court, lose
sovereign powers that are inconsistent with their political status within
the American legal system. As an example, tribes allegedly cannot
323
make treaties with foreign powers.
Congress believed that the United States Supreme Court made a
mistake in Duro v. Reina. Congress legislatively overruled the Duro
decision with a provision contained in an appropriations statute.2
Known as the Duro-fix, this legislation was tested in United States v.
Lara.325 Billy Jo Lara was a member of the Turtle Mountain Band of
Chippewa Indians in North Dakota. 26 While on the reservation of the
Spirit Lake Tribe of North Dakota, he assaulted a federal law
320. No citizen of a foreign country has ever served on the United States Supreme
Court.
321. See Duro, 495 U.S. at 684-88.
322. See generally Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
323. See id. at 208-09.
324. See Dep't of Defense Appropriations Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077(b)-
(d), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892-93 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006)) (providing that "'powers
of self-government' means and includes all governmental powers possessed by an Indian
tribe, executive, legislative, and judicial, and all offices, bodies, and tribunals by and through
which they are executed, including courts of Indian offenses; and means the inherent power
of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all
Indians").
325. See 541 U.S. 193, 197-98 (2004).
326. See id. at 196.
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enforcement officer.32 7  Mr. Lara pled guilty to a tribal charge of
committing "violence to a policeman" and served a ninety-day
sentence. "
After pleading guilty to the tribal charge, he was charged in the
federal district court of North Dakota with the federal crime of
assaulting a police officer.329 Because of the similarity between the tribal
and federal criminal offenses, Mr. Lara claimed that the federal
prosecution was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.33 The validity of his claim hinged on whether the criminal
jurisdiction of the Spirit Lake Tribal court was an inherent authority
belonging to the tribe or one that the tribe had acquired through a grant
of power from Congress when it passed the Duro-fix legislation.3 In
United States v. Wheeler, the Supreme Court decided that the general
criminal jurisdiction of a tribe derives from its inherent sovereignty and
does not derive from Congress.332 Accordingly, the Navajo Nation in the
Wheeler case was viewed as a separate sovereign whose prior criminal
prosecution did not bar Mr. Wheeler's subsequent federal prosecution
by operation of the double jeopardy protection afforded him in the Fifth
Amendment.333
The Court in the Lara case, in an opinion written by Justice Breyer,
concluded that Congress had the power to clarify inherent tribal
sovereignty 34 and that the intent of the Duro-fix was not to grant a
power tribes did not have but to confirm powers that they always had
and never lost.335 Put another way, Congress reversed the decision and
the logic of the Supreme Court's decision in Duro.
33 6
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy explained that the basis
of the decision could be narrower based solely on the determination of
Congress that it did not delegate power to the tribe.337 Justice Kennedy,
out of loyalty to his opinion in Duro, assumed that the tribe did not have
327. See id.
328. See id.
329. See id. at 197.
330. See id.
331. See id. at 197-98.
332. See 435 U.S. 313, 322-23, 328 (1978).
333. See id. at 328-30.
334. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 199-205.
335. See id. at 206-07.
336. Justice Breyer approached the judicialllegislative difference of opinion
diplomatically by pointing out that the Court routinely looks at all sources of authority and
that the Duro-fix legislation was not there at the time the court decided Duro. See id.
337. See id. at 211-12 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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criminal jurisdiction until the Duro-fix.338 He conceded that Congress
had the power to clarify the situation.339 But he was not so sure that
Congress had the power to place a United States citizen outside the
protections of the United States Constitution.' Justice Kennedy is
correct that Mr. Lara's rights in the tribal court are defined by tribal law
and by the standards that Congress has established in the Indian Civil
Rights Act. 4' The procedural rights of the United States Constitution
do not apply in the tribal court proceeding. 2 The fallacy of Justice
Kennedy's logic is his assumption that tribes lost (or perhaps never had)
inherent sovereignty to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-member
Indians.4 '3 Finally, an unstated assumption of his position is that the
quality of tribal justice cannot equal the quality of justice to be delivered
by the federal government. However, a rereading of Oliphant, Duro,
and Lara paints a picture of responsible tribal law enforcement. By not
providing tribes with criminal jurisdiction, the Court encourages
lawlessness. In Lara, where the tribal court exercised criminal
jurisdiction, Mr. Lara did the crime and served the time. In Oliphant
and Duro, the Supreme Court tied the hands of tribal law enforcement,
thereby allowing Mr. Oliphant to escape the possibility of punishment
for allegedly destroying property and Mr. Duro for allegedly committing
murder.'
In any case, the question still remains. Does the dicta in Duro mean
anything after Congress reversed the decision with the Duro-fix and
after the Supreme Court has validated this legislative solution? I do not
think so. But obviously, state courts looking for any excuse to expand
state taxing power are willing to rely on dicta from a case that Congress
has legislatively invalidated.
B. The State Cases and Legislative Responses
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in deciding in favor of the imposition
of the Wisconsin income tax on a non-member Indian living and
working on the Oneida Reservation, relied on Colville and Duro.45 Ms.
338. See id. at 212.
339. See id. at 211.
340. See id. at 212.
341. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2006) (passed in 1968).
342. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 212 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
343. See id.
344. In both cases, the punishment would have taken place only if the defendants pled
or were found guilty.
345. See LaRock v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 621 N.W.2d 907, 909 (Wis. 2001). For
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Joan LaRock was a member of the Menominee Tribe in Wisconsin and
married a member of the Oneida Tribe. 6 She and her husband lived on
the Oneida reservation and had four children, all of whom were
members of the Oneida Tribe. 37 She and her husband divorced, but she
continued to live on the Oneida Reservation with her children.348 Ms.
LaRock worked at the tribe's casino, and these earnings were the
income that Wisconsin sought to tax. 34 9
The reasoning of the Wisconsin Supreme Court started with
McClanahan and then explained how Colville and Duro confirmed that
the state's power to impose its income tax extended to non-member
Indians. In answering Ms. LaRock's contention that Colville should
be limited to its facts and not extended to an income tax, the court
essentially reasoned that a tax was a tax.351' And a non-member was a
non-member.352 The court ignored her connection to the Oneida Tribe
through residence, marriage, children, and employment. The court
claimed that Colville established a bright-line test of non-membership.53
Although it quoted Justice White's language in Colville noting the lack
of evidence showing connection, the court never discussed Ms.
LaRock's many connections to the Oneida Tribe. 354  Finally, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court failed to consider the absence of tribal efforts
to market a tax exemption.5
It is especially ironic that Justice White's opinion in Cabazon paved
the way for the Oneida casino in Wisconsin. It was the absence of
marketing a tax exemption that kept California from regulating the
bingo operation of the Cabazon Band.3 6 The Cabazon decision led to
the passage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act357 by Congress, which
in turn led to an agreement (gaming compact) between Wisconsin and
thoughtful criticism of the LaRock case from a lawyer who worked on behalf of Ms. LaRock,
see generally Jennifer Nutt Carleton, State Income Taxation of Nonmember Indians in Indian
Country, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 253 (2002).




350. See id. at 911-12.
351. See id. at 912-13.
352. See id.
353. See id. at 913.
354. See id. at 912-13.
355. See id. at 911-12.
356. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 219-20 (1987).
357. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2006).
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the Oneida Tribe, which allowed the operation of the casino, thereby
providing Ms. LaRock with a job and the financial means to raise four
children. Although Ms. LaRock may not be a member of the Oneida
Tribe and she may not be able to vote in Oneida tribal elections, she is
an important and vital part of the social and cultural fabric that makes
up the Oneida Nation and the reservation community.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court seized on the opportunity to apply a
mechanical, bright-line test that is not supported by the case law.
Colville involved a narrow holding contingent on the absence of a
factual showing and was further narrowed with the Supreme Court's
decision in Cabazon. Likewise, the Duro dicta became meaningless
when Congress stepped in and reaffirmed the historical reality that non-
member Indians have always been an important and critical part of the
cultural, social, economic, and political life of most federally recognized
Indian tribes.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals, in New Mexico Taxation and
Revenue Department v. Greaves,358 approached the issue in basically the
same way as the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The court noted its earlier
opinion in which it had applied McClanahan to exempt on-reservation
income of a non-member Indian,359 but it ultimately read Colville and
Duro as permitting state income taxation of non-member Indians, with
virtually no analysis.36 A closer reading of the cases would have shown
the court the limitations of Colville and Duro as Supreme Court
precedent .36 1
358. See 864 P.2d 324 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).
359. See id. at 325. The earlier decision is worthy of brief consideration. It was decided
three years after McClanahan and involved a member of the Comanche Tribe who lived on
and worked for the Navajo Nation. See Fox v. Bureau of Revenue, 531 P.2d 1234, 1234 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 540 P.2d 248 (N.M. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976). The
New Mexico court relied on McClanahan and decisions from three other states. See id. at
1234-36. The court noted that Ms. Fox was married to a non-Indian and that she conceded
that his income was subject to the New Mexico income tax. See id. at 1234. The court made
no further exploration of her ties to the Navajo Tribe or the nature of her job. Finally,
lawyers for the Bureau of Revenue felt strongly enough about their case in Fox to go to the
trouble of filing certiorari petitions to both the New Mexico and the United States Supreme
Courts-part of the unending onslaught. The decisions show that Frank Katz was the lawyer
for the New Mexico Department of Taxation and Revenue in Fox and in Greaves, some
eighteen years later.
360. See Greaves, 864 P.2d at 325.
361. The weakness of the court's analysis is described in Kyle T. Nayback, Comment,
New Mexico Taxes Non-Member Indians Who Work on a Reservation: New Mexico Taxation
and Revenue Dep't v. Greaves, 25 N.M. L. REV. 129, 137-39 (1995) (criticizing the court's
expansive use of Colville and Duro).
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More recently, the tax commissioner of North Dakota has attempted
to relitigate its earlier loss in White Eagle v. Dorgan.362 The case
involved Thelma Luger, a member of the Cheyenne River Tribe in
South Dakota, who lived and ran a convenience store on the Standing
Rock Reservation in North Dakota.3 63 Ms. Luger's father was a member
of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe and her mother was a member of the
Standing Rock Tribe.3" Following tradition, Ms. Luger, who was
eligible for membership in both tribes, elected to become an enrolled
member of her father's tribe.365 Ms. Luger's extended family included
relatives from both tribes.3 6
Her convenience store on the Standing Rock Reservation provided
important goods and services to the reservation community. 367 The vast
majority of her customers were members of the Standing Rock Tribe.'
Her convenience store had value to the community, not because it
profited from the marketing of a tax exemption, but because she was
willing to set up a business in a remote area so the members of the
community would not have to travel long distances to buy food and
fuel.3 69 Ms. Luger's case went before an administrative law judge.37" Her
lawyer fully briefed the case and explained the limitations of Colville
and Duro as precedent. 371' Her lawyer also explained how the New
Mexico and Wisconsin courts had erroneously applied Colville and
Duro as binding precedent.37  The administrative law judge, not
surprisingly, held in favor of North Dakota's power to impose its income
tax on Ms. Luger, finding her to be the equivalent of a non-Indian
resident of the Standing Rock Tribe, notwithstanding her extensive
family and economic ties to it.373 Her case, at least for future years,
became moot when the tribes in North Dakota succeeded in convincing
the North Dakota legislature to adopt a statutory rule exempting non-
362. See 209 N.W.2d 621, 622 (N.D. 1973).
363. See Luger v. Fong, N.D. Office of Admin. Hearings, File No. 20050257 (Dec. 28,








371. See Petitioner's Brief in Luger v. Fong (on file with author).
372. See id.
373. See Luger v. Fong, N.D. Office of Admin. Hearings, File No. 20050257 (Dec. 28,
2006) (on file with author).
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member Indians' incomes from the state income tax when they live and
work on another tribe's reservation.374
North Dakota now joins Oregon and Idaho, both of which
previously adopted state legislation providing exemption for non-
member Indians.375 Arizona has a cigarette case that follows Colville
376
and has taken the position that Colville extends to the state income
taxation of non-member Indians who live and work on reservations
other than their own. We have no definitive answers for California,
Minnesota, 37 9 and Montana,380  all of which had authority favoring
exemption but are now taking different administrative directions.
IV. THE FINAL RESOLUTION
Ultimately, the question of state income taxation of non-member
Indians will need to be resolved by the United States Supreme Court.
This Article has made the historic case that Indian tribes have occupied
a position of political separation from early colonial times to the
present. This separation has meant that states have little or no taxing
power over tribes, their resources, or those reservation Indians living
374. See H.R. 1393, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2007) (passed January 3, 2007 and not
yet codified), available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/60-2007/bill-text/HANQO3 0 0 .pdf.
375. See OR. REV. STAT. § 316.777 (2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-3026A(4)(b)(iv)
(2007).
376. See Ariz. Dep't of Revenue v. Dillon, 826 P.2d 1186, 1196 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991)
(failing to discuss the "marketing of a tax exemption" logic that Justice White used in Colville
and failing to consider the effect of the Duro-fix legislation).
377. See In re Smith, 158 B.R. 818, 818 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1993) (finding that a Navajo
husband of a member of the Hopi Tribe who lived with his wife on her reservation was liable
for the Arizona income tax; the court applied Colville and Duro).
378. California had previously issued a favorable ruling, which it has since withdrawn.
379. The Minnesota Supreme Court decision in Topash v. Commissioner of Revenue,
291 N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 1980), was overruled explicitly in State v. R.M.H., 617 N.W.2d 55, 64
(Minn. 2000). The R.M.H. case, however, involved Minnesota's assertion of jurisdiction
based on its traffic code over a non-member Indian who was driving on a state highway
located on a reservation of which he was not a member. Id. at 57. To extend this logic to
state income taxation is something of a stretch in logic. Accordingly, the Minnesota Supreme
Court may have to examine the continuing validity of the Topash case.
380. Montana followed New Mexico's early decision in Fox and ruled in favor of
exemption for a non-member Indian. See LaRoque v. State, 583 P.2d 1059 (Mont. 1978). The
Wisconsin Supreme Court in its LaRock decision stated that the Montana LaRoque decision
was superseded by promulgation of MONT. ADMIN. R. § 42.15.121(1) (transferred to MONT.
ADMIN. R. § 42.15.220 (2007)). My reading of the regulation is that it confirms exemption
from state income taxation for Native Americans who live and work on their own reservation
but does not answer the non-member Indian question. Finally, I could not find any judicial
authority that questions the continuing validity of the Montana Supreme Court's decision in
LaRoque.
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within tribal territory. This makes intuitive sense because we know that
the power to tax is the power to destroy. The United States Supreme
Court has described states as the foremost enemy of tribes. Since the
nineteenth century, state taxing authorities have mounted an unending
onslaught in their attempts to tax anything and everything in Indian
Country. A current initiative is state income taxation of non-member
Indians who live and work on other reservations. As this Article has
shown, treating non-member Indians the same as non-Indians ignores
their important place in the history of Indian Country and ignores their
current roles as mothers and fathers, husbands and wives, members of
extended families, federal employees, tribal employees, teachers,
lawyers, doctors, accountants, and entrepreneurs. They were and are a
critical part of the social, cultural, and political fabric of those
communities that we call reservation Indians.
Because he was dealing with cigarettes and the marketing of a tax
exemption, Justice White in the Colville case saw little reason to align
non-member Indians with tribal members. He saw them as passive
reservation occupants playing no important role in reservation life. The
collective stories of the income tax cases paint an entirely different
picture. This picture should be the starting point of the analysis. Justice
White admitted that he had no evidence to conclude otherwise.
Wisconsin, New Mexico, and Arizona have had the evidence before
them but have decided to ignore it in favor of applying a stiff mechanical
approach that reads cases carelessly and applies them well beyond their
original scope.
When the Supreme Court addresses the issue, it needs to
acknowledge that Colville is distinguishable from and has been
substantially narrowed by Cabazon. In addition, Duro is of little
significance because Congress has decided that the Supreme Court got it
all wrong. Accordingly, the Court should start at the beginning and
acknowledge the relevant history. This Article shows that no treaties
and no federal legislation authorize states to impose their state income
tax on non-member Indians who live and work on the reservation of
another tribe.
Finally, the Court should concede that allowing state taxation of
non-member Indians effectively reduces the tribal tax base. The Court
has acknowledged that federally recognized Indian tribes retain the
inherent power to tax. In fact, that was a major and positive holding in
the Colville case. Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in Colville
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carefully explains how state and tribal taxation on the same transaction
create a problem.38' For practical purposes, state income taxation, if
allowed, prevents or substantially reduces the number and amount of
taxes that the tribes can impose. To protect tribal sovereignty, the
Court should find tribes immune from state income taxation because
Congress has never authorized it and because it would enhance tribal
self-government.
381. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447
U.S. 134, 174-76 (1980) (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
* * *
